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U.S. -China economic relations are currently strained as a direct
result of the Chinese crackdown of demonstrators in Tiananmen
square on June 4, 1989. However, the brutal suppression of the
demonstrators is only one aspect of the overall Sino-U.S. economic
relationship. This thesis examines the economic relationship
beginning in 1978, when China embarked on its modernization effort.
Though China has made many improvements in these efforts their
modernization effort does not necessarily coincide with United States'
desires. Instead, China is concerned with maintaining its socialist
character for the foreseeable future. This thesis examines divergent
Sino-U.S. economic relations, and offers some various
recommendations for American policy-makers depending on the
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I. INTRODUCTION
Former President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 was only
one of many steps on the road to normal Sino-U.S. relations, albeit a
vital step. Prior to formal diplomatic recognition between the United
States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on January 1, 1979,
the Chinese took decisive steps on their road to reformation. During
the latter part of 1978, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CCP
Central Committee, Communist China decided to embark on a reform
program that would include opening China to the world and initiating
structural changes within the economic and political systems. It
seemed that China had finally realized the futility of the planned
socialist system and isolationist policies.
In 1989, however, world perception of the sincerity and
genuineness of the political leaders in China to actually carry out
reform changed. The mass crackdown in Tiananmen Square in June,
1989, was a horrible enough act, in and of itself for most "Western"
countries, as well as the rest of the world. What made the
crackdown even worse in those perceptions was the fall of nearly all
the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe later the same year.
Congressman Dan Burton (Republican, Indiana) expressed a common
feeling; namely, the turning of public opinion against the Chinese
regime:
For us to give any assistance to a continuing repressive regime
like Communist China, when the countries of Eastern Europe
are making dramatic progress toward democracy, is just
ludicrous. If East Germany and Rumania can make democratic
changes, why can't China do it. 1
China not only shocked the world with its brutality but
disappointed the anti-communist "winners" of the cold war, notably
the United States.
The question of why China failed to aspire more heartily to
democracy is interesting and will be debated in academic, political,
and economic circles for a long time. The question however,
presupposes that China's reforms that tended to relax centralized
control of the economy would eventually lead to a fully functional
market economy similar to those in "democratic" or "western"
countries. Taking into consideration perastroika and glasnost in the
late 1980's within the Soviet Union that paralleled China's
modernization, most in the U.S. hoped that economic reform in China
would lead to political reform. The Tiananmen debacle proved a
tremendous disappointment. U.S. policy toward China, before
Tiananmen, had sought ties that would counterbalance the U.S.S.R.
Furthermore, the U.S. had sought China's support to reduce tensions
in East and Southeast Asia, particularly Taiwan, Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Korea. The Americans had also instigated a wide variety of
exchanges to bolster political and economic reform and promote
1 Robert Pear, "Bush Hails a Thaw in China, Congress Is Skeptical," New York
TimesfNVn . June 12, 1990, Al:3.
human rights in China. And the U.S. had also endeavored to increase
economic and commercial relations in order to facilitate China's
movement toward a market-oriented economy. 2 The June massacre,
however, swept away the expectations U.S. policy-makers had
regarding China.
The Tiananmen debacle had another profound effect on U.S. China
policy. The linkage between human rights policy and economic
policies was reappraised by the U.S. administration, particularly
President Bush. Having worked in China and obtaining a "close"
relationship with China's leaders the President was as surprised as
anyone by the events in Beijing. However, being closely associated
with Deng Xioaping and the other leaders of China, perhaps Bush
should not have been so shocked by such events.
Was this not the same regime that had recently enacted martial
law and killed thousands in Tibet? Was this not the same regime
that had recently prevented Fang Lizhi, the Chinese astro-physicist
and human rights advocate, from attending a dinner engagement in
Beijing at President Bush's invitation? If one takes a close look back
in history, one realizes that Deng Xioaping supported the Anti-
Rightist Movement in the late 1950's, and struck down the 1979
Democracy Wall movement. It should not have been so much a
2 See Lawrence Eagleburger's testimony before the Congress, Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Towards China: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign
Relations . 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 7 February, 1990, p4.
surprise to anyone that this same regime would crush a similar
democracy movement in 1989.
Then why were American China specialists, and especially those
making policy, so astonished at Beijing's actions? Simply put,
someone (or many people) were caught off-guard. Primarily, this
involved mis-assessment of the goals of China's program known as
the "four modernizations". China specialists might have better
understood that "modernization" implied infinitely more than mere
improvement in its agricultural sector, its industrial base, science and
technology, and its defense. China no longer wanted to be, at best, a
second rate power.
The problem deepened when China started to implement its
reforms. Like so many other countries, the Chinese realized that the
key to modernizing in all sectors would be economic improvement.
Thus, economic reform would have to be the first place to start. It
was only the prelude to further reforms that would presumably
follow. Because of the scope and course that the reforms took, it is
not difficult to see how so many China-watchers in the U.S. began to
believe that China was, in fact, only shedding its socialist malaise and
going "capitalist," without anticipating its further effects.
This would be a major mistake by the China-watchers, but not
the only one. It was not realized how far the Chinese Government
would go in brutal suppression of the opposition. Aware of the wide
range of problems arising from Tiananmen, this paper will focus only
on the economic aspects of the U.S. -China relationship. The major
question in contemporary U.S. China policy is whether or not Most
Favored Nation (MFN) should be granted to the Chinese. Therefore,
instead of asking, "Why can't China become a capitalist democracy?"
It is better to ask what was China attempting to accomplish by
"opening up" to the world, pursuing the "four modernizations," and
using "market regulation" as the goal of its reform movement.
Furthermore, how China views such issues as the Sino-U.S. trade
relationship and finance(banking and loan) problems will enable
decision-makers to use this information to their advantage in future
policy planning.
The section entitled "China's Economic Revolution" examines
China's economic reforms before Tiananmen, both agricultural and
industrial, and where they were headed. It argues that China's
economic reform did not specifically intend to achieve a capitalist
market orientation. China was trying to achieve a better standard of
living for its own people, taking fullest advantage of circumstances in
China. The Chinese were eager to benefit their own country,
regardless of labels or Western perceptions.
The following section discusses Sino-U.S. economic interaction.
American policy aimed at assisting China to go capitalist; Chinese
policy was to ask for assistance in national development, whether
capitalist or not. This gap in perceptions cast doubt on the efficiency
of U.S. policy in facilitating China's move toward a market economy.
Did U.S. trade policy target those areas considered critical by China's
leadership? Did the U.S. provide the technological and financial aid
needed to enhance China's reform? If not, what were the causes and
reasons for the failure?
The next section looks at what China has done since that fateful
event in Tiananmen Square. The purpose here is to determine if the
Chinese reforms were permanently damaged, or if there are
indications that the new leadership intends to continue with its basic
modernization program. The road that China has taken since June,
1989, will determine future U.S. economic policies towards China.
The section on U.S. policy after Tiananmen considers the U.S.
reaction to the Tiananmen incident as it has affected China's reform
program. Here we analyze the two major sides, those that feel U.S.
policy should be based on moral grounds and continue punishing
China, and those who feel that the relationship is worth a major
effort to preserve. Which U.S. attitudes prevail will have a great
influence in determining China's future. Do economic restrictions
help or hinder the Chinese people? Will restrictions coerce China's
leaders into conforming to U.S. wishes?
Finally, the conclusion provides a coherent basis for any future
U.S. policy decision. Policy recommendations are presented,
depending upon fundamental choices made by the Chinese in
determining their own future.
It is not the purpose here to compare the pros and cons of the
free market systems versus planned economies. Both have their
limitations. Though the collapse of socialist systems throughout East
Europe may indicate the superiority of the capitalist system, it
cannot be denied there are differences within the capitalist systems
of the world, for example the U.S. and Japan. There are indeed those
who argue that the American system has already surpassed its peak
and may take a back seat to the Japanese, though this argument is
far from settled. 3 However, this is not the concern of this paper. Its
scope is strictly limited to the issues surrounding the Sino-U.S.
economic relationship.
3 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall Of The Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books,
1987), 677pp.
II. CHINA'S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
The purpose of this section is to look at China's economic reform
movement in an attempt to gain a better understanding of why
certain policies were initiated and others were not. By
understanding what China was attempting to accomplish through
their reforms will hopefully enable U.S. policy-makers to formulate
more appropriate policies based on U.S. interests in the future. It
may also explain, in part, why the U.S. has reacted so adversely to
the June, 1989, crackdown of demonstrators in Tiananmen square.
The point being that U.S. china-watchers and policy-makers may
have mis-interpreted the signs flowing out of Beijing.
China's agriculture was the first sector of China's economy to
receive reforms. This was considered by China's leaders to be basic to
broadening reforms to the rest of the economy. That is, if reforms
failed in the rural sector, there would be no use in trying to spread
reform to the urban centers.
After agriculture came industry. Industrial reforms were
essential to link China to the global economic system, and hence the
key area of U.S. -China economic relations. It is apparent that the
entire modernization program was never intended to create a
predominantly market-oriented economy as most in the U.S. had
hoped. China's leadership attempted to justify newly introduced
market concepts as still conforming to the socialist revolution. It is
essential for future American policy decision-makers to understand
that China's leadership usually means what is says, and that
seemingly rhetorical statements should not be passed off lightly in
the future.
A. AGRICULTURAL REFORM
One of the first and most effective reform initiatives coming out
of China involved the state increasing its procurement prices for
agricultural goods in late 1979 and early 1980. This was perhaps the
first price reform measure taken by the Chinese Government, in that
it may have equated selling price with the cost of production. It was
not price reform in the sense that prices were regulated by the
market. Not only did the state increase prices paid to the farmer, but
they also froze the quota requirements for mandatory delivery to the
state. Farmers that produced above the required limit were allowed
to sell that share of annual output on the open market, at what
became a higher price than state prices.4
This new policy would become known as the household
responsibility system and was adopted as a uniform national policy
in 1983. The formalized system consisted of collectives assigning
plots of land to peasant families to farm. The peasant families would
then provide their share of taxes due the government, provide the
required amount of products purchased by the state under the
4Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1987), pplOl-102.
mandatory quota system, and pay the required fees owed to the
collective. Then the above quota production could be consumed by
the family, sold to the state at state prices, or sold on the open
market.
The household responsibility system eventually provided for the
abolition of the communes established under Mao, and transferred
control to the production brigades. 5 Mao was contemptuous of the
concepts of specialization and comparative advantage, and therefore
favored the notion that every sector of society should be engaged in
the same set of economic activities as all others. This would be
reflected in the insistence that all of China's agricultural communes,
which numbered 50,000 in the mid-1970's, should devote
paramount attention to the production of grain, regardless of terrain
and climate.
The establishment of the household responsibility system,
however, eventually allowed the control over agricultural land to be
transferred to smaller production brigades. Responsibility for
agricultural services and local industry was frequently shifted to
government agencies, collective enterprises, or even individual
peasant households. This allowed the peasants to have a greater say
in what and how much was produced. Thus, farmers could plant
other crops than grain and choose appropriate crops for the
environmental conditions. In other words, the agricultural reforms
5 Ibid., p!03.
10
encouraged diversification; the peasants could produce industrial
crops. The communes were being phased by 1983, and all were
deactivated by December, 1985. 6
In this way the reforms helped to establish a rudimentary form
of rural industrialization. These new industries could be individual
or collective, and included the raising of livestock, providing
transport services to farmers, and other low level industrial goods.
On its part, the state would try to provide rural transportation to
help the distribution of goods. Through this rural industry, the
government attempted to absorb most of the surplus labor in China's
rural areas. The expansion of these alternative employment
opportunities focused on a goal of decreasing China's rural labor from
85% in 1984 to 30% by the year 2000. 7
The initial effects of the reforms were tremendous. Between
1978 and 1986 real farm family incomes increased 100 percent. 8
Average annual growth during the period 1979-84 was seven-point-
seven percent, but dropped to four percent during the period 1985-
88 (this would prove troublesome considering China's inflation rate
of 25% in 1989). Furthermore, with rural industry excluded, the
^See the note below Table B-2, Appendix B, in James T. H. Hsao, China's Development
Strategies And Foreign Aid (Lexington: D.C. Health and Company, 1987), pl47.
7Harding, pl02.
^Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A gricultural Reform In The Soviet Union And
China: Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee . 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,7 September,
1989, pl3.
1 1
average monetary output of an agricultural laborer increased from
660 yuan in 1980 to 840 yuan in 1986. Perhaps most important, the
average peasant income grew from 134 yuan, in 1978 to 424 yuan in
1986 while average consumption grew from 132 yuan in 1978 to
352 yuan in 1986. 9
Though the (then) new reforms gave China's peasantry new hope
and financial improvements the agricultural reforms would have
their share of problems. One particular concern of the government's
was low agricultural investment. For years the peasant's had worked
on collectives under state plans without property rights or
ownership. Though the household responsibility system had
basically leased property to the peasants for cultivation the peasants
were still reluctant to invest in land they did not officially own; there
was no guarantee that the state would not take the land back at a
later date. Thus, in 1984 the state pledged to leave the division of
land unchanged for 15 years to give farmers an incentive to invest.
Another problem that arose had to do with the increased state
procurement prices. Though the state was paying higher prices to
the peasants, and the peasants were selling more to the state, the
resultant rising cost of agricultural products was not passed on to the
consumer. Consequently, a rapid increase occurred in state subsidies
for agricultural products. To solve this, in 1985 the state would no
longer issue mandatory quotas. Instead, the state replaced
"Harding, p274.
12
mandatory state purchases of grain with the voluntary procurement
contract system. This consisted of the state setting targets for
procurement of a small number of products, such as grain, cotton and
other important industrial crops, and offered to sign purchase
contracts for those products with the peasants. The government also
reduced the price controls on some agricultural products including
meat, eggs, and vegetables. The quick result was to decrease grain
production by six percent and the average price rose nine percent. 10
The government then attempted to increase incentives for grain
production, such as giving farmers scarce inputs like fertilizer and
diesel fuel at subsidized prices. Tax reductions, and low interest
loans were also included to get farmers to grow grain.
Another interesting point concerning agricultural modernization
in China was a contradiction in the state's stated priority in the sector
and the actual investment the state plans called for in agriculture.
Over the years, state budget expenditures dropped from 13.6% in
1978 to 8.3% in 1985, and to a low of about five percent in 1988.
The total amount invested in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985)
was 30% less than in Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-80). 11
Summarizing, it is apparent that China made legitimate attempts
at modernizing its agricultural sector. However, the reforms have
10 Ibid., p72.
I* Congress, Joint Economic Committee, p34. This differs from Harry Harding's data
indicating state investment dropped from 10.6% in 1978 to 3.3% in 1986, see Harding, The
Second Revolution. pl07.
13
not been without major problems and the benefits derived from
them began to subside in the mid-1980's. According to Harry
Harding, the Chinese Government needs to increases its investment
in agriculture or it will be difficult to sustain the rates of growth seen
early on in the reform movement. Furthermore, China may continue
to have shortfalls of grain because of the abandonment of mandatory
quotas for grain. Further price reform, such as removing subsidized
consumer prices, may be needed to improve grain production.
B. INDUSTRIAL REFORM
Soon after the death of Mao, the post-Mao leadership conducted a
review of China's economic performance during the period from
1957 to the 1970's. Attention had to be extended to the industrial
sector of the economy. Two major findings were the result. First,
China produced chronic shortages of useful goods and chronic
surpluses of useless goods. This was in part a result of low labor
productivity. The second major problem was poor capital
productivity through technological stagnation of the engineering
kind. 12 For example, the Chinese estimated that fully 60% of the
technology employed in their industry in 1980 was completely
obsolete, and the rest was in dire need of upgrading. 13 It was
12Jan S. Prybyla, "A Broken System," in The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen ,




determined that the principle problem was systemic. That is, the
problems resulted from the central administrative command
planning system because that system did not address problems of
scarcity.
Thus, to address the problems inherent with scarcity, China's
economy would be carried out on the basis of public ownership while
at the same time using the supplementary role of "regulation" by the
market mechanism. 14 This would be one of the guiding principles for
future economic reforms. Only the distribution of national revenue,
investment in capital construction, and rationing of important
products would be included in the unified state plan and be put
under the direct control of the state. Thus, large enterprises would
continue to have limited independence. However, medium and small
enterprises, which had a closer link to the market, would be granted
more independence, but not total independence. The Chinese would
also regulate the rate of growth.
To achieve greater independence for the small to medium sized
companies, the Chinese extended, to various degrees, regional, and
especially, enterprise's autonomy and make systematic use of the
regulation function of the market. For example the early reforms of
late 1978 created first, production teams, then individual families,
which were assigned state production quotas and allowed control
1
4
Wen Wei Po in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Daily Report. China
(hereafter referred to as FBIS). August 31, 1981, W4.
15
over the disposal of any above quota production in the market, very
similar to the household responsibility system. Some of the state
enterprises were also allowed to retain a share of the profits and to
sell independently their above quota portion. Individual markets
were opened to allow for distribution. As with grain production,
state revenues declined as a greater share of the profits were
withheld. However, investment at the local level rose. 15
Another factor important in achieving better and more useful
goods required planning and business administration departments to
acquire the skill of manipulating economic levers with a view to
inducing grassroots enterprises to engage in activities which met the
requirements of the state plan. 16 The economic levers to be used
included the price mechanism; or as the Chinese put it:
Use the law of value as a regulator to regulate the supply and
demand relationship of all kinds of products through the price
mechanism so as to ensure proportional development of the
national economy. 17
Thus, government institutions would begin to manipulate the
economic levers that the market regulated in a capitalist economy.
This may sound like a far cry from economic reform, but as Xue
Muqiao, a Chinese economist, put it:
^Harding, p71.
16




To give enterprises greater autonomy and to let the market
forces perform their regulatory function does not mean that the
state may relax its supervision and control over economic life. 18
Instead of putting all economic activities into the state plan, the
State would use economic levers and legislation to induce enterprises
to engage in activities in compliance with the state plan. Xue
justified this by stating that capitalist countries also supervised
enterprise activities, but they used levers and legislation instead of a
state plan. The key was to get China to begin concentrating
production on goods that were needed and the quality of those goods.
Chen Yun, the noted Chinese economist, summed it up:
Since we are running socialist enterprises, we should pay all
the more attention to whether or not the products are
marketable, where the raw materials come from and how the
enterprises should be operated. 19
Another huge problem of the command economy system, and
perhaps inherited from the Soviet model, was over-investment in
capital construction projects and an emphasis on the mandatory
quotas of products that were, as mentioned earlier, useless. Thus,
China's industrial reform was aimed at solving the problem of large
deficits resulting from unproductive projects, stabilizing commodity
prices, preventing inflation, and ensuring the overall stability of the
economy. Therefore, instead of concentrating on high quotas and
18 Ibid., K15
19
"Chen Yun Discusses Economic Strategy At Meeting," FBIS . March 9, 1982, W1-W2.
17
heavy industry as had been done in the past, China attempted to
restructure the economy with the goal of coordinating the
development of agriculture, light industry, energy, raw materials,
machine-building and electronics industries, transport and
communications, commercial services, as well as science, culture and
education. 20 No longer would China rely on expanding capital
construction and setting up new enterprises. Instead, China would
use the full potential of existing enterprises, rectify and reorganize
those existing enterprises, and raise the productive forces by
carrying out technological transformation in a planned way.
One method involved a State Council decision on widening the
commodities circulation channels between cities and rural areas and
increasing the supply of manufactured goods to rural areas. 21 China
needed to tap the labor resource of the 800 million peasants in order
to produce goods for the masses. Key to the success was to provide
peasants with low cost durable commodities as well as medium and
high grade commodities which were mainly needed in the cities.
Another method used to curb the excessive expansion of capital
construction was to exercise highly concentrated management over
capital construction, further readjust the distribution relationship in
the national income, and concentrate the necessary funds for
20"Renmin Ribao Discusses Economic Readjustment," FBIS . January 8, 1982, K10.
2l
"Renmin Ribao Urges Opening Rural Market," FBIS . August 31, 1982, K15.
18
enhancing the major projects. 22 However, with all the talk of
decreasing the emphasis in capital construction the actual share of
national investment in capital construction occurring outside the
state budget rose from 16.7% in 1978. to 61.5% in 1986. 23
The other key element to achieving industrial modernization was
China's "open door" policy. The main idea driving this policy was to
acquire foreign capital and technology for investment because of the
lack of Chinese capital and antiquated technology. The foreign
capital and associated technology would be used particularly for
investment in light and medium industries and agriculture. The
emphasis would be on developing energy, transportation and
telecommunications, raw materials, commodities for basic necessities,
and, most importantly, goods for export. The Chinese would
emphasize the export industry because only through exports would
they be able to acquire the necessary foreign exchange to pay for
borrowed capital.
However, opening up would prove to be tricky because of past
emphasis on self-reliance. Thus, a number of articles appeared in
the Chinese press to convince the cadres of the importance of
opening up to receive foreign capital and technology for the
modernization while at the same time justify that this would not
impair China's ability to remain self reliant. For example, a Liaoning
22
"Renmin Ribao On Handling Economic Situation," FBIS . July 14, 1983, K13.
23 Harding, pi 16.
19
Ribao editorial remarked, "using foreign investment does not go
against the policy of self-reliance. Upholding the policy of self-
reliance does not mean 'using less foreign technology or investment;'
self-reliance means 'upholding national sovereignty in the main.'24
Similarly, a Yangchen Wanbao article stated:
In implementing the open-door economic policies today, we
are not reenacting history. Rather, being masters of a socialist
country, we are acting on our own initiative to make use of
foreign investment and importing technology in order to benefit
the building of socialist material and spiritual civilization in our
country. 25
The fear of foreign influences was not limited to the fear of being
dominated by foreign imperialists either. The Chinese also feared
that opening up to capitalist countries would pollute and corrupt
their society. Part of this problem manifested itself when foreign
capital was invested in night clubs, hair salons, and other non-vital
enterprises:
The adoption of the open-door economic policies will definitely
bring the ideology of capitalist societies, and the bourgeois way
of life and customs will inevitably pound at our society. That is
why we are strengthening ideological and political education and
resisting the corrupt bourgeois way of life. This is a serious task
of our struggle.26
24
"Liaoning Ribao Urges 'Bold' Foreign Investment," FBIS. December 9, 1981, S5-S6.
25" Yangchen Wanbao Discusses Foreign Influences," FBIS . February 24, 1982, K5.
26 Ibid.
20
Therefore, when the SEZ's (Special Economic Zones) were
established in 1979 they were not only used to bring in foreign
capital and technology, but were the primary test sites for economic
and social reform. They were also intended to serve as mechanisms
for introducing, studying, and absorbing technology for application in
a wider range of industries.
However, the ability of the zones to produce goods for export
would remain a major priority. In the mid-1980s this would be
reaffirmed when the Shenzhen SEZ was accused of making the
majority of its profits off of mainland China instead of through
exports. When asked about this case State Councilor Gu Mu replied:
If the special economic zones cannot develop an export-
oriented economy and make more contributions by earning
foreign exchange through export trade, it will become
meaningless to have them. 27
The SEZ's consisted of four areas along the eastern coast,
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou. Obviously intended to
encourage foreign investment in export projects, these areas were
ideally suited because of the better than average infrastructure and
access to port facilities. Another advantage to the location of the
SEZ's were the proximity to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, which
had proven themselves as successful traders on the global market.
27
"Gu Mu On Open Policy, Special Economic Zones," FBIS . April 11, 1986, K2.
21
Thus, the SEZ's would serve as bridges to link these areas with
mainland.
To facilitate investment and make the plan work the Government
promised to improve the infrastructure, provide a well-trained labor
force, offer preferential tax rates and exemptions, and allow time for
holidays in the zones. The enterprises in these zones were also given
greater autonomy in that they were allowed to keep a greater share
of profits, and management was allowed to pursue the interests of
the company, to a point. In other words, China would expand the
earlier industrial reforms similar to the household responsibility
system to entire regions instead of individual families and small
businesses.
Besides the provisions mentioned above, the PRC created a
number of incentives which were intended to reward foreign
investors. In 1981, China exempted import duties and industrial and
consolidated taxes on advanced machinery equipment not available
in China which was imported under contract by foreign partners.
The enterprises receiving such benefits involved priority projects
such as energy development and oil extraction, rail, road, and harbor
construction, agriculture, forestry, livestock, crop cultivation,
research and development, and health and medicine.28
Further measures were taken in 1983-1984 to reduce the scope
of mandatory planning, grant greater autonomy to enterprises, and
28
"New Tax Rules To Encourage Foreign Enterprises," FBIS . February 2, 1984, pi.
22
decentralize the foreign trade apparatus. Apparently, the Chinese
saw considerable advancement with the SEZ's and there incentives
because the CPC Central Committee and State Council adopted a plan
in 1985 to open up fourteen coastal cities and three coastal zones.29
China also sought further reforms in the state finance system and
changes in the wage system. 30
Though China's adoption of the SEZ's, coastal cities and open
zones, various tax breaks, and the reduction of overly centralized
management helped to improve the standard of living of the average
worker, there were basic problems the leadership had difficulty in
dealing with. One particular problem was the pace that reform
should take. Besides the problems with saturating Chinese culture
too quickly with foreigners and their associated "pollutants," relaxing
prices and increasing foreign imports resulted in high inflation and
growing trade deficits.
To counter the adverse impact of reform, China would follow
growth cycles with periods of retrenchment. 31 Many of the policies
during these periods were antithetical to reform. For example, in
periods of retrenchment China would slash the rate of investment,
29The 14 coastal cities are: Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, Qingdao,
Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Behai; the 3
coastal open zones are: Chang Jiang and Zhu Jiang deltas, and the Xiamen-Zhangzhou-





decrease the rate of growth in the money supply, and reduce
production quotas. Furthermore, as a result of a one-point-five
billion dollar deficit in 1985 and a six-point-four billion dollar deficit
in the first half of 1986, China placed restrictions on the ability of the
"open" cities to conclude investment contracts with foreign firms, and
limited access to foreign exchange.
However, as characteristic of the roller coaster ride of reform,
urban reforms were restarted in the fall of 1986. China adopted a
new labor system, relaxed price controls on some manufactured
consumer goods, promulgated a draft law on enterprise bankruptcy,
and experimented with capital markets by allowing a few state-run
enterprises to be leased to individuals or groups of workers, or
issuing shares of stock and forming a board of directors.
Besides having a difficult time in deciding how the pace of reform
should proceed, there were basic obstacles to foreign investment
The prospect of utilizing an abundant supply of low-cost labor
proved to be wishful thinking. During the early stages of reform,
enterprises did not have the authority to hire and fire as they
pleased. Most of the labor had to be approved by local, regional, or
even central institutions. Furthermore, most Chinese laborers were
poorly trained and/or disciplined.
Foreign enterprises faced other difficulties such as the high cost
of important inputs including land, housing, and office space. There
was the low quality of Chinese components, uncertain availability of
raw materials, difficulties in obtaining loans in Chinese currency, an
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incomplete legal system, overburdened communications and
transport systems, and convoluted lines of authority in the Chinese
bureaucracy to contend with.
China, in good faith, would attempt to respond to these
complaints. They would lower the cost of doing business by reducing
land use fees, taxes, the cost of some inputs, and wage rates. They
also promised to improved access to crucial inputs controlled by the
State including water, electricity, communications, transport, and
renminbi (Chinese currency) loans. China also tried to increase the
efficiency with which the bureaucracy approved projects by
establishing deadlines for such decisions and through creation of
local service agencies that could expedite the review process. And,,
again, they would guarantee greater authority over production plans,
imports and exports, wages and bonuses, and employment dismissal
of labor to the enterprises.
However, while increasing the number of institutions that could
guarantee foreign investments and expedite the review process from
33 to 41, the individual guarantee limit of each institution was
decreased. 32 Provincial limits were also cut, sometimes by half.
Furthermore, the coverage of the guarantee dropped from 100% to
70%.
In addition, though tax incentives were provided in 1984, new
taxes were imposed in 1985 that included levies on income earned
32
"PRC Changes Investment Guarantee Policies," FBIS . November 8, 1985, Wl.
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from services and consultations. A five percent income tax was
imposed on foreign enterprises retroactive June 1, 1985. A 15% tax
was applied to all offices receiving commissions, rebates, fees and
other income for providing consultation, market surveys, liaison and
other services to clients in China. As one Western diplomat put it,
the tax regulations were "ambiguous." 33 Thus, it appeared to foreign
investors that China was inconsistent in its policies and that the
freedom to make a decision was more rhetoric than reality.
It is actions such as these that tended to discourage foreign
investment and hinder China's overall reform policies. For example,
even though the leadership offered to reform the trade system it did
not necessarily result in greater freedom:
The reform, is focused on freeing business enterprises from
the administrative structure of the state and on decentralizing
management powers. After the reform, the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade will exercise unified leadership
and specialized management over foreign economic activities
and foreign trade in the whole country so as to perform the
state's function of managing foreign trade work. 34
It seems that the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade (MOFERT) was the creation of one more centralized institution
to "exercise unified" leadership over China's trade industry and not
to facilitate enterprise autonomy.
33
"Reaction To New PRC Tax Regulations Reported," FBIS . May 17, 1985, W3.
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The issue of price reform applies to both agriculture and
industry, and seems central to achieving successful reform. Price
reform would become another major avenue to achieve
modernization. Because prices changed infrequently under Mao,
relative prices became distorted; that is, prices may have been too
low, fees for services too low or below cost, and prices of
manufactured goods, such as steel, too high. Furthermore, prices
were not allowed to vary due to transportation costs, seasonality, or
quality.
As a result, prices on many commodities would be freed; some
goods were put under the double pricing system; and prices on vital
agricultural goods, such as grain, and raw materials would remain
fixed. Yet, there was also reluctance to let the prices go completely
free. Furthermore, if inflation was too high, all goods were subject to
some form of control. For example, the State Council issued a Circular
on Stabilizing Prices on January 8, 1982, because people had refused
to buy goods through state commerce and planned distribution
centers, yet were trading domestic commodities on the open and
black markets.
At least China felt that even fixed prices must be based on
quality. 35 Though this bears some resemblance to market regulation,
quality alone did not set prices in the free market. However, it was a
35
"On Fixing Prices Based On Quality," FBIS . August 26, 1983, K10-K11.
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step in the right direction. The Chinese also maintained that planned
prices did not mean fixed prices. Major products bought by the State
would have price controls, other products may have no price
restrictions. More importantly, the Chinese leadership tried to
simulate a market economy. That is, the state controlled prices to
balance supply with demand and to equate price with equality.36
To correct the problems outlined above, Zhao Ziyang established a
new pricing system consisting of fixed prices, floating prices, and
market prices. The goal of the new pricing system was to reduce
control by the state over production and pricing. The new system
involved three channels for the distribution of commodities:
mandatory planning (administrative orders), guidance planning
(incentives by economic levers), and the marketplace (price control,
if anything). Throughout the course of reform the number of
commodities subject to mandatory planning was reduced. 37 For
example, industrial products were reduced from over 500 products
subjected to mandatory planning in the 1950's to eventually 60. In
addition, agricultural commodities under mandatory plans were cut
from 29 in 1984 to zero in 1985 with the adoption of the
procurement contract system.
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The new price system was closely associated with the above
distribution channels. Generally speaking, goods under mandatory
planning had fixed prices. The number of industrial products sold at
fixed prices was reduced from 256 to 29 under the new reforms.
Likewise, the number of categories of consumer goods sold at state-
set prices was reduced from 85 to 37, and the number of agricultural
products with fixed prices dropped from 113 to 25.
Floating prices involved the state establishing a range within
which prices could vary. The exact price was then determined by a
contract between the producer and consumer or on the market. This
system was first introduced in 1978 along with the first agricultural
reforms and is associated with guidance planning.
Market prices are obviously connected to the marketplace, and
consists primarily of small consumer goods and agricultural products
What must be remembered about Chinese market prices is that the
price, simply put, was allowed to fluctuate. In September, 1982,
enterprises were allowed to set prices for 160 commodities, and in
1983, given similar authority for another 350 categories of goods. In
1985, with the end of mandatory purchasing, the prices of meat, fish,
poultry, and vegetables were allowed to move freely on the
marketplace. 38
In summary, China's industrial reforms have changed the basic
structure of China's economy and raised the standard of living of
38 Ibid., pplll-112.
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urban workers. For example, the average urban wage grew from
614 yuan in 1978 to 1329 yuan in 1986. In addition, average
consumption rose from 383 to 865 yuan. 39
Yet at the same time it appears that industrial reform has not
been sufficient to date. The onset of major inflation in 1987-88
along with corruption and a dissatisfied public led to the catastrophe
of Tiananmen. In order for China to better their economic system
they must increase competition among similar enterprises, provide
the threat of bankruptcy for unprofitable producers, allow the
emergence of markets for the factors of production (labor and
capital), enhance price reform policies, and truly grant managerial
autonomy. 40 Without such moves China's reform movement will not
bring about the free market system so readily sought by the West.
Therefore, if China's reforms are not indicating a move in such a
direction, was a capitalist system ever a goal?
D. A SOCIALIST FRAMEWORK
The reform movement carried out by China after 1978 became
central to every aspect of China's way of life; and the heart of this
reform was the four modernizations. Modernizations were necessary




level of development similar to those of the Newly Industrialized
Countries in the 1970's.
Though the reform movement talked of opening up to the world
and introducing market regulations the central theme of China's
modernization was, and remains, socialist modernization. Market
regulation would only be a supplement to the centrally planned
economy.
Before the 3rd Plenary Session of the CCP in 1978 Deng Xiaoping
began to send signals to the Party leadership of what was to come.
Though Deng intended to introduce radical reforms into the socialist
system(radical for China) it seems he had to tread carefully after the
recent death of Mao Zedong so as to maintain power. Thus, Deng
gave credit to Mao where it was due, and blamed the sorry state of
conditions on the "gang of four." In a letter dated April 10, 1977,
Deng wrote to the Central Committee:
We must forever apply accurate and complete Mao Zedong
Thought to guide the whole party, the whole army and the
people of the whole country, to triumphantly press forward the
cause of the party and socialism and the cause of the
international communist movement.41
The main emphasis in the letter was that Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought had basic principles that were useful. The problem
with Mao's programs was that conditions at that time did not permit
41
"Comrade Deng Xiaoping Talks On Questions Of Correcting Party Work Style," FBIS .
November 3, 1981, Kl.
31
him to utilize these principles effectively, but now the proper
conditions existed.
Deng would also expand Mao Zedong thought. On August 18,
1977, in his closing address to the 11th Central Committee Deng
mentioned the "Four Principles" that must be continued:
We must revive and carry forward the mass line, the fine
tradition and style which Chairman Mao fostered...We must
revive and carry forward the practice of seeking truth from
facts. ..We must revive and carry forward the practice of
criticism and self-criticism. ..We must revive and carry forward
the practice of democratic centralism.42
Though the above quotations were primarily directed at
correcting party work style in the aftermath of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution(GPCR) and the "wrong" policies under the gang of
four, it underlined the communist ideology of the Party and indicated
how the PRC leadership, particularly Deng, would intend to carry out
future reforms. On November 27, 1978, during the 3rd Plenary
Session, Deng would spell it out in no uncertain terms: "Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is the guiding ideology for our
country to accomplish the four modernizations."43 There would be
no divergence from the socialist road.
Since that session the bureaucratic wheels of Chinese society




of 1989 (and afterward), there was little noted in the Chinese press
that indicated any resemblance of China embarking on the "capitalist
road." Instead, Chinese economists emphasized the development of a
national economy in a planned and appropriate manner. The
authoritative news agency, Xinhua, stated: "a socialist state like ours
must carry out a planned economy on the basis of public ownership"
while bringing in the supplementary role of market regulation.44
The article attacked those cadres that believed a planned economy
was "of little importance;" and that "these people regard the past
occasional errors in building ideology and methods in planned
economy as the very drawbacks of a planned economy and reflect
planned economy as a basic principle of socialist economic
development, which is incorrect."
The idea was to strengthen planning of the macroeconomy
including the use of economic leverages such as prices, taxes, interest
rates, and so forth, mentioned above, to guide (control?) the
enterprises' economic activities. Without using a planned system an
"anarchic situation" may arise "if these activities are not controlled
by a state plan and if there is no regulation by economic leverages
and no supervision by the various executive organizations." In
essence, China would maintain a coordinated economy. If the
economy was not coordinated in the proper way, and enterprises and
peasants were allowed to do what they wanted, the state plan would
44
"Beijing Economists Stress Planned Economy," FBIS . January 5, 1982, Rl
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be upset and may lead to stockpiling, inefficiency, and a general
waste of resources.45
Another justification for stressing the planned economy was a
fear of declining production in those areas vital to the state as a
whole and the people's livelihood. In other words, the leaders did
not believe that market mechanisms would insure the proper
distribution of capital investment to those areas it was most needed.
A Renmin Ribao commentator remarked:
Although a good variety of products are produced under
market regulation, their value constitutes only a very small
portion of the total value of social production as a whole. ..they
are not major products that are vital to the national economy
and the people's livelihood. Thus, compared with the products
produced and circulated according to plan, they are only in a
secondary position. ..As to how large the scope of such products
should be, it is defined by the unified state plan. Therefore, it
should be clearly affirmed that the planned economies, by and
large, form the main body of our economy. There should be no
misunderstanding whatever about this.46
One interesting aspect of China's reform measures was how the
market would be used. "It should be pointed out that making use of
the market does not equate to market regulation" 47 in China. The
Chinese were quite aware that "regulation" was when the means of
production and quantity are set by price fluctuations in market
^"Renmin Ribao Editorial Stresses Planned Economy," FBIS . February 26, 1982, Kl.
^"Renmin Ribao On Reforming Planning System," FBIS. September 21, 1982, K2.
47 Ibid., K5.
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supply and demand; that activities of the market are guided by
"spontaneous forces of the market." However, the PRC did not intend
on allowing the market to make these determinations. Contrary to
capitalist ideals, the Chinese intended to study the situation,
determine what was needed and where, then provide goods and
services through state plans. In other words, the state would
interpret how the market would respond under the circumstances
and plan accordingly:
Although the enterprises implementing mandatory or guidance
plans are also influenced by changes in prices, taxation and
credits, these economic levers are all applied by the state in a
planned way. Therefore, in the final analysis, they are
controlled by state plans and are not regulated by the market.48
Another point was that the Chinese Communists did not feel that
capitalism, or Western style economic systems, were compatible with
the Chinese situation. It was mentioned earlier that Deng Xiaoping
did not feel the circumstances were right when Mao controlled the
reins to implement the reforms, but that the situation had changed.
Thus, a recurring theme in dealing with China is that one must adapt
to the situation, and that all situations are different. Therefore, one
can not expect a socialist country to implement capitalist reform;
socialist countries must implement socialist reform:
48 Ibid.
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We should not neglect the fact that the modernization we are
striving to build is based on a socialist society rather than on a
capitalist society. Therefore, not only are some concepts and
theories of economics not suited to the economic reality in China,
but some basic premises on which economies is based are in
conflict with the socialist system.49
Even though agricultural reforms have been highly successful
there are many aspects that still equate with a planned economy.
Even though China's leaders acknowledge that planting is susceptible
to local conditions the right to plant freely is not allowed. This would
not allow for a proper relationship between "the state, the collective
and the individual commune member." Thus, "carrying out planting
in line with local conditions does not mean free planting."50 In fact,
agriculture should be guided by state plans, and the components of
the agricultural economy should develop in coordinated manner.
Another startling discovery is that even the most renowned
proponents of reforms, and those considered by the West to have
encouraged steps towards a truly market economy, were stating the
need to maintain a socialist system. For example, in 1986 Hu
Yaobang, then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party,
stated:
49"Renmin Ribao On Applying Western Economics In PRC," FBIS . December 2, 1983,
K12.
50
"Planting Under Guidance Of State Plan Urged," FBIS . March 5, 1982, K22.
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Socialism has existed for several decades. However, in the
history of mankind it is something new. It has also provided
political confusion. Many may consider this proof of the lack of
efficiency of socialism and deny its vitality. I am not of that
opinion. Because it is something new, insufficiencies are
unavoidable. When mistakes are made, one can try again.
Lenin's ideas, for instance, are full of life. He said we would
make some stupid mistakes. However, that is no reason for
fear---after mistakes you can make a fresh start. 5 1
In retrospect, it is hard to determine if such statements were
meant to stave off critical attacks from more hardline Politburo
members or whether or not they were actual policy. Considering
what has transpired, it is conceivable that both may have been
factors.
In summary, the Chinese leaders realized that something
different was needed to pull China out from the abyss into which the
Cultural Revolution had plunged them. Reforms were needed. But
being good communists they would carry out a socialist revolution.
The market mechanism would be secondary to the planned economy.
51
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III. SINO-U.S. ECONOMIC INTERACTION
The second aspect that needs to be considered in Sino-U.S.
economic relations is how the two countries interacted in the
economic arena. Even though it appears U.S. policy-makers mis-
interpreted Chinese intentions concerning the goal of reform, it
seems logical that U.S. economic policy would concentrate on the
areas identified by China's leaders as essential to modernization if it
were true that one of the goals of U.S. policy was to enhance
economic and commercial relations so as to move China toward a
market economy.
Therefore, we should see steps on the part of the U.S. to
transfer the necessary technologies and management skills to China
to enhance infrastructure, agricultural production, and commodity
production of basic goods. Though some of this has occurred, there
are a number of signs that indicate that U.S. policy was short of the
mark. To be sure, part of the problems arising resulted from China's
inability to follow through with some reforms, and the failure to
implement others necessary to entice foreign investment. On the
other hand, it appears the U.S. has difficulty dealing with communist
countries in general, China being no exception. Furthermore, during
a period of declining competitiveness, increasing trade deficits, and
protectionist lobbying, it is not too surprising that the U.S. reacted to
a newly emerging international competitor in the way that it did.
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A. TRADE AND RESTRICTIONS
After normalization in 1979, Sino-U.S. trade expanded
enormously. Total two-way trade in 1979 was less than one billion
dollars. This was primarily in textile exports to the U.S. and chemical
fertilizer imports from the U.S. By 1983 trade had increased to $4.4
billion with an accumulated total for the period 1979-1983 of $22
billion. As of 1989, bilateral trade topped $12 billion.52 The top ten
Chinese exports included sweaters, petroleum, toys, rubber footwear,
telephones, dolls, artificial flowers, stuffed toys, rubber/plastic soled
footwear, and radio-tape players. The Chinese imported electronics,
aviation equipment, transportation equipment, communications,
construction materials, and received industrial technological
transformation.
Besides the growth in trade, U.S. direct investment in China,
between 1979 and 1989, involved over 950 ventures totalling over
four billion dollars, making the United States the largest investor in
China( this is only about one-point-five percent of U.S. total
investments of $260 billion worldwide). 53 Chinese businesses have
also signed over 627 contracts worth over $2.26 for U.S.
52A number of articles were used to obtain these figures. For 1983 see "Wang
Yaoting Views Sino-U.S. Trade Relations," FBIS. April 24, 1984, Bl; for 1989 see
"Retention of Trade Status With U.S. Urged," FBIS. April 4, 1990, p4, and Susumu
Awanohara, "Rights or duties?" Far Eastern Economic Review(FEER) . May 3, 1990, p43.
53
"U.S. Urged Not To Suspend MFN Status," FBIS. April 23, 1990, 9; The figure of $4
billion differs greatly from an $8 billion figure reported by Nicholas R. Lardy, China's
Entry Into The World Economy: Implications For Northeast A sia And The United States .
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1987), p6.
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technologies. 54 As one can see, bilateral economic relations have
made a tremendous start. Needless to say, there are a number of
problems plaguing Sino-U.S. economic relations. The major areas of
contention include trade deficits and import restrictions.
A major problem with trade deficits, and one that lends a great
deal of confusion to trade problems in general, is how the trade
figures are derived. The United States counts goods from both China
and Hong Kong when figuring trade totals with the PRC. China, on the
other hand, counts only direct Sino-U.S. trade and discounts re-
exports and re-imports from Hong Kong. 55 For example, in 1989
two-way trade totalled $12.1 billion excluding Hong Kong, with
Chinese exports totalling $4.3 billion and Chinese imports totalling
$7.8 billion. This would give China a deficit of $3.5 billion. However,
the U.S. claimed a trade deficit with China of $3.7 billion because the
U.S. government included Hong Kong's re-exports worth $8.5
billion(re-imports totalled $1.3 billion).56
54
"'Roundup' Urges Relaxation on U.S. Technology," FBIS . July 15, 1988, 8.
55 See both Awanohara, p43; and "Retention of Trade Status With U.S. Urged," in FBIS .
April 4, 1990, p4.
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"Virtually all figures I found were inconsistent. For example, the "Retention of
Trade" article lists Chinese Exports to the U.S. as $4.3 billion and imports at $7.8 billion,
providing a total of $12.1 billion. Awanohara, "Rights or duties?" comes closest to this
listing Chinese direct exports at $4.4 billion and imports at $7.9 billion; when including
Hong Kong, Chinese exports total $12.9 billion and imports are $9.2 billion, giving the
U.S. a deficit of $3.7 billion. However, this differs from Susumu Awanohara, "No more
favours," FEER . April 19, 1990, pl2, which put the U.S. 1988 deficit at $3.5 billion and
the 1989 deficit at $6.2 billion. Yet the $6.2 billion figure compares with Carl Goldstein,
"China needles US," FEER . January 24, 1991, p35, which put the '89 U.S. deficit at $6.5
billion and estimates the 1990 deficit with China at $12 billion.
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This has repercussions in two ways. First, China emphatically
resists large trade deficits mainly because they lack the foreign
exchange to pay for them. They also tend to narrowly focus in on the
bilateral relationship when discussing deficits. Therefore, even if
they may have an overall surplus they will still point out bilateral
deficit problems. 57
This is directly linked to the second problem which also involves
trade restrictions, foreign investments, and technology
transfers(discussed below). Mainly, when the Chinese have a deficit
with a particular country they will attempt to expand exports to that
country while at the same time reducing imports, just as any other
prudent nation would do(witness U.S. -Japan "trade-wars"). A typical
Chinese response to a trade deficit with the U.S. is:
If this state of affairs is not remedied, the quick development
of trade between the two countries cannot be maintained.58
In textile negotiations(discussed in greater detail below) the
Chinese continuously alluded to the trade imbalance(and other
problems) to justify their position against U.S. textile restrictions:
57 China had an overall surplus of $8.1 billion in 1990, the first in 7 years, see
Elizabeth Cheng, "Power to the centre," FEER. January 24, 1991, p35.
5 %"Shijie Jingji On International, Sino-U.S. Trade," FBIS . August 19, 1982, A4.
41
Sino-U.S. [textile] trade is a part of Sino-U.S. trade as a whole.
Thus, textile negotiations ought to take the overall situation of
trade between the two countries into serious consideration.59
Closely linked with the trade imbalance, trade restrictions are the
second major issue in Sino-U.S. economic relations. The Chinese feel
that "there are undeniably many obstacles and difficulties in
bilateral economic cooperation and trade", but that "fundamentally
they arise from the fact that the United States has so far delayed
changing its policy of discriminatory restrictions on trade with
China. "60
Furthermore, U. S. trade restrictions exacerbate China's problem
because without trade they lose the capital to apply towards
servicing their debt. From the U.S. perspective, the deficit has
doubled the past two years in a row, and was justification for
protectionist measures.
Interestingly enough, many in the U.S. agree with China's
position. In an address given before a joint economic meeting Donald
Regan, then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, said:
The United States will try to remove impediments obstructing
the development of trade and economic relations between the
two countries,61
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such as the abrogation of out-of-date legislation. Perhaps the key
word here was "try."
The Jackson-Vanik amendment and the issue of Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status for China is at the heart of the trade restriction
issue. The Chinese state that the Sino-U.S. Trade Agreement signed
in 1979 accorded one another MFN treatment. Furthermore, they
argue, MFN in "legal terms" is an international commitment and the
U.S. has no right to unilaterally carry out so called examinations.62
The examinations referred to here are the U.S.'s consideration of
China's emigration policy. Jakson-Vanik requires any communist
country that applies for MFN to meet U.S. requirements on
emigration; essentially, a free emigration policy. The PRC further
argues that the first Clause in the first Item of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stipulates that signatories
should grant MFN status to one another.
But MFN had already been granted to China in 1980. Why were
the Chinese so upset? Primarily because China's emigration policies
or the presidential waivers to Jackson-Vanik had to be reviewed
annually. The Chinese felt this to be an infringement of their
internal affairs and sovereignty. This issue would not only become
exacerbated by the Tiananmen incident, but become the central issue
in U.S. debate over economic policy with China, and will be discussed
in more detail (see Section IV).
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Another major trade problem consists of U.S. protectionist
measures on the import of Chinese textiles. When the first Sino-U.S.
Textile Agreement was signed in 1980 only eight categories of
Chinese goods were restricted from U.S. markets. By the end of 1986
that number had grown to 48. Those are only direct restrictions.
China, in an attempt to appease U.S. textile manufacturers and avoid
further restrictions, had unilaterally restricted 22 items under
Voluntary Economic Restraints, at the demand of the U.S. no less. All
in all, 90% of Chinese textiles had restrictions of one form or another
by 1986.63 Most of these restrictions had come in the form of
Congressional legislation.
On September 7, 1984 the "country-of-origin-rule" was to go into
effect. The rule stated that semi-finished goods imported for re-
export must be substantially altered in order to put a different
country label on the finished product. What this meant for China
was that semi-finished textiles sent to Hong Kong for finishing and
re-exporting to the U.S. would be charged to China's export quotas
unless substantially altered. At stake were numerous contracts
between Hong Kong and Guangdong province that effected 400-500
factories and up to 50,000 workers.64
Zhang Wenjin, then PRC Ambassador to the U.S., wrote a letter to
the U.S. Government protesting the measure "which would create
63
"Sino-American Textile Talks Called 'Failure'," FBIS . December 2, 1986, B3.
64 " South China Morning Post On U.S. Textile Rules." FBIS . August 15, 1984, W3.
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further difficulties for China's textile exports," and that the new rules
"constitute a clear violation " of the bilateral trade agreement and the
Multiple Fibre Agreement.65 The American Association of Exporters
and Importers textile and apparel group considered the rule "a
blatant new trade barrier."66 Their main concern was the effect the
rule would have on unfilled contracts. To alleviate this problem the
U.S. extended the effective date to October 31, 1984, for those
shipments ordered prior to August 3, 1984.
In 1985 the textile issue was reheated by the U.S. Trade
Enforcement Act. This bill put additional restrictions on textile
imports. Apparently, China's exports would be cut by 56%, a
potential loss of $500 million. 67 In 1987 the U.S. obtained another
agreement that cut the annual rate of growth by volume in Chinese
textile exports from 19% to three percent. Furthermore, in 1990 the
U.S. Senate passed another bill decreasing the growth rate to one
percent (as of this writing it had not been signed into law).
Particularly infuriating to the Chinese was that the bill applied to all
countries except Canada and Israel.
Though the majority of these laws were probably aimed at Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, the Chinese are particularly
touchy because textiles account for 38% of their exports to the U.S
65
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[Ref. 68].68 They feel that these restrictions will hinder their access
to foreign exchange which is vital to their modernization efforts.
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND RESTRICTIONS
The other important factor in China's open door policy besides
developing export industries was acquiring foreign technology. U.S.
policy tended to compliment this goal. Though the United States'
ability to influence Chinese developments was considered limited, it
was felt that technology transfers could build ties between the two
countries. This would also enhance China's strength vis a vis the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, technology transfers could lead to
important commercial ties and the eventual export of U.S. products.
Finally, because China was a poor country, technology transfer could
be an important element in humanitarian efforts.69
Another reason technology transfer would be crucial to relations
was an eventual requirement by the Chinese Government that
foreign ventures export or supply advanced technology in return for
access to Chinese markets. China's lack of foreign exchange to
purchase new technologies was part of the reason for this request.
In 1972 China was listed in category "Y"(of U.S. rules on
technology export) which was severe restriction. In 1980 this was
68 Ibid.
"^Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Technolog y
Transfer to China: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade . 100th Cong., 1st Sess, 8 July, 1987, p5.
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upgraded to category "P," which was "somewhat" restrictive. Finally,
in 1983 China obtained category V, which meant China was
considered a "non-allied friend." 70 In other words, China was to be
considered similar to some of the NATO nations. However, China
complained that because they were still listed as a non-market
economy, they were discriminated against. For example, they are
still unable to receive high-technology goods or those with military-
civilian applications.
In 1979 a broad agreement, followed by 25 protocols
implementing the agreement, was signed covering specific areas such
as telecommunications, agriculture, space, environmental protection,
transportation, and student/scholar exchanges. 71 Such contacts have
facilitated commercial transactions and political contacts. The
presence of 17,00 Chinese students and scholars in U.S. universities
has been one of the most effective forms of transfer.
Further agreements have been reached In August, 1984, the U.S.
and China sign a technological cooperation agreement whereby the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of the Interior would
provide technological help to design and construct the Three Gorges
Dam on the Yangtze river. 72 However, construction had not started
70
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as of May 3, 1991. The agreement also established work programs in
electronics, telecommunications, machine building, and building
materials. 73 In the workshops, Chinese representatives would outline
priority areas and U.S. representatives would identify U.S. companies
with expertise in those areas. Furthermore in 1985, an Agreement
on Nuclear Cooperation provided the legal framework for U.S.
companies to sell nuclear material, equipment, and services to
China. 74
Because technology transfers have been only partially successful
they have created one more area of contention between the two
countries. It appears that the main problem, from the U.S.
perspective, is that China is a socialist nation. Though United States'
China policy is predicated on the assumption that closer relations are
better, sanctions must continue to be exercised in areas of advanced
technology. 75 Though this policy has had some success, such as China
playing an increasing constructive international role, and bilateral
trade had become significant, the reasons for caution have not been
eliminated. China was still considered a potential adversary; China
had an alien ideology; and China's political system was unpredictable.
Furthermore, there was a sense that China was potentially another
73 Congress, Technology Transfer . p71.
74Qingshan Tan, "U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement," Asian Survey. Vol. 29,
No. 9 (September, 1989), p870.
75 Congress, Technology Transfer. p6.
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NIC (Newly Industrialized Country) rapidly upgrading its production
in technology and aggressively seeking international markets. There
was fear that China could eventually become more powerful than
Japan or South Korea with respect to technology transfer.
The most troubling aspect was what would China do with the
technology received vis a vis the military, particularly in arms sales.
The Chinese considered the sale of arms as just another means of
acquiring foreign exchange to help its modernization efforts. The
U.S., however, saw military arms sales as a way to stabilize (or
destabilize) the geostrategic balance. Thus, when China became a
major player in the international arms sales business, the U.S. was
concerned.
The Iran-Iraq war facilitated China's arms sales. Prior to the war,
most Chinese arms went to the Asian buffer states of North Korea,
North Vietnam, and Pakistan. Once China became involved in the
Middle East market, their sales boomed, ranking fifth in the world,
after the Soviet Union, the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom.76
Chinese arms sales in the region increased dramatically during
the period 1980-1987. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency published data indicating that 80% of China's arms deliveries
from 1982-1986 went to the Middle East. Arms sales to Iran and
Iraq comprised 74% of China's total. Though the sales included
'"For a detailed look at Sino-U.S. military relations see Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese Arms
Sales And U.S.-China Military Relations," Asian Survey . Vol. 29, No. 6(June 1989), pp601-
18.
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ground equipment such as tanks and artillery, the primary concern
involved China's sale of the HY-2 Silkworm missile. These were anti-
ship weapons and posed a potential threat to U.S. war ships operating
in the Gulf. Exacerbating this, it was discovered that China had sold
the CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missile to Saudi Arabia in
March, 1988, there were potential plans to sell Syria the M-9 short
range ballistic missile that same year (June), and Egypt was a
growing customer. Besides the Middle East market, China's continued
sales to Pakistan, and the growing sales to Thailand did not help. The
U.S. saw Chinese arms sales as destabilizing these regions. It did not
help matters when China disputed the sales to the Middle East, then
eventually remarked that "some Chinese-made arms may have made
their way to the Persian Gulf" through the complicated international
arms market. 77
The Chinese, however, felt that the U.S. criticism of Chinese arms
sales was hypocritical. As Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian put it:
Whenever China sells weapons, China becomes the newsmaker.
How about the weapons flying over the Gulf? There are many
kinds of them... these are not Chinese weapons. Why is it that
some people always harass China with this so called issue?78
The point should be well taken. Why are U.S. weapons sales to




underlying factor be that the Chinese are taking a good share of the
international arms market away from the number one seller, the
United States? This may be partly true, but the fact that Chinese
Silkworms may end up attacking U.S. warships did not set well in the
Pentagon.
In March, 1988, both countries took steps to solve the problem.
The U.S. State Department lifted its freeze on technology exports to
China in return for Chinese reassurances that it would take steps to
stop delivery of the Silkworms. China also pledged to support an
effort to get Iran to accept the U.N. Resolution 598, which would call
for a cease fire to the war. This may have settled the Persian Gulf
problem, but what about China's sales to other countries such as
Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Pakistan, and the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia (thought to be supplied through the Thailand connection).
In the summer of 1988 Secretary of State George Schultz visited
Beijing to discuss these matters. Shultz remarked after the visit:
The Chinese told me that they had not made any sale of
ballistic missiles to a country other than Saudi Arabia. ..As for
ballistic missiles in general, we didn't come to any agreement
about it, but I think it has been worthwhile to talk about it, and
I am sure that the subject will continue to be an important one
on our agenda.79
In September Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, while visiting
China, was told that future sales would be "very prudent and very
79 Ibid., p614.
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serious." Furthermore, the Chinese promised to behave in a
responsible way. The Chinese also promulgate three principles on
arms sales:
China is a responsible country. We always assume a serious,
prudent, and responsible attitude toward the military products
export question. In this regard, we strictly adhere to three
principles: First, our military products export should help
strengthen the legitimate self-defense capability of the countries
concerned; second, it should help safeguard and promote peace,
security, and stability in the regions concerned; and third, we do
not use the military sale to interfere in the internal affairs of
other nations. 80
Finally, the U.S. acknowledged China's right to make arms sales
decisions, but retains the right to express concern when U.S. interests
are threatened.
Another problem regarding technology transfer occurs from
private industry doing business in China. One associated problem are
long negotiation periods. 81 For example, the company Wang
Laboratories, negotiated for seven years until an agreement was
reached. In another case, McDonnell Douglas negotiated over a ten
year period. Finally, the recent satellite's released to the PRC for
launching were initially begun in the 1970's. Then, there are the
numerous other difficulties of doing business in China mentioned
80 Ibid., p607.
81 Congress, Technology Transfer . plO.
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earlier that prevent foreign investment, and hence, technology
transfer.
Probably the most problematic area of technology transfers deals
with dual-use technologies and the U.S. bureaucracy that overseas
such transfers. Advanced dual-use technologies and arms can be
exported to China on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature
of the technology, the Chinese recipient, conditions of the sale, and
other factors. As it implies, this process is highly complex, difficult to
administer, and can yield to inconsistent decisions and time delays.
U.S. industries are critical of the process, citing lengthy reviews,
and lost contracts. Most countries only take a few weeks while the
U.S. could take months or even years to approve a contract.
Furthermore, the U.S. is the only country that unilaterally imposes
controls on items not listed in COCOM (Coordinated Committee).
Primarily, the U.S. controls exports on computers,
telecommunications, precision instruments, and advanced
manufacturing equipment. The "green zone", in which items are
likely to be approved, covers 30 categories. In 1987 the green zone
was increased, raising the data processing rate for computers from
155 to 285. The increase provided an individual category for disc
drives, allowed the export of higher capacity computer chips, and
increased value limits on servicing equipment.
Above this green zone are products that would make a direct and
significant contribution to six critical military capabilities. These
include nuclear weapons and delivery systems, Anti-Submarine
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Warfare, intelligence collection, power projection, Electronic Warfare,
and air superiority. Interestingly enough, 50% of such cases went to
COCOM in 1985 but only 20% went in 1986.
Thus, when a product falls into a yellow (may be approved) or
red zone (almost never approved), there is a review period by the
Department of Defense (DOD). Furthermore, there appears to be no
distinct cut off point between the yellow and red zones. Thus, the
Department of Commerce (DOC) may be pushing for a contract in
what it feels is a yellow zone case whereas the DOD is stating the
product falls into the red zone.82
According to Section 10(g) of the Export Administration Act, there
is a process for settling such disagreements. This process, however,
which culminates in an appeal to the President, is rarely involved.
Instead, controversial cases bounce back and forth between the DOC
and DOD for months or years. Furthermore, the statutory time limits
are not adhered to. It has been estimated that hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of exports have been lost to these delays.
Needles to say, the difficulties associated with technology
transfers have not thoroughly satisfied the leadership in Beijing.
Commenting on President Bush's election victory, Fei Xiaotong, a
Chinese sociologist, felt the help from the U.S. appeared great, but
was in actuality, very little. Fei said the U.S. should give China more
82 Ibid., ppl9-28.
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technology transfers and increase its investments, a sentiment felt
by many of China's leaders.83
China also feels that the U.S. uses technology restrictions to
compel them to conform to U.S. policies. In March, 1988, the United
States was considering relaxing restrictions on exports of high
technology equipment to China because they had finally stopped
sending "Silkworm" missiles to Iran. 84 However, later that summer,
it had been determined that China had not stopped those sales. The
Senate (97-0), therefore, adopted a proposal to re-examine the
potential sales of arms and technology transfers to China. 85 The Bill
was approved 80-16, asking President Reagan to "reassess relations
with China if Beijing does not stop selling missiles to the Middle East."
Restrictions on technology transfers are also viewed as a U.S.
attempt to hinder China's modernization. However, many of the
transfers are through direct and/or joint investments which U.S.
businesses complain are hindered by China's laws. Fortunately, both
sides agree that their should be mutual cooperation in these areas.
Gu Mu, China's Minister of the State Administrative Commission on
Import and Export Affairs and Foreign Investment Control
Commission, states: "We want to increase trade and economic
83FBIS. November 28, 1988, p8.
84David K. Shipler, "U.S. Informs China High-Tech Exports Could Be Widened," NYT.
March 10, 1988: Al; 1.
85
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cooperation with foreign countries on the principle of equality and
mutual benefit." 86 Likewise, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Walter Stoessel remarked:
The U.S. -China relationship, like all relationships between
equal, sovereign nations, should be guided by the fundamental
principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.87
C. FINANCIAL AID AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS
A final aspect to look at are those involving financial matters. As
mention earlier, without foreign capital, mainly hard currency, China
is unable to make investments within the country and/or unable to
pay debts. The U.S. has a number of promotional programs that
support trade with and technology transfers to China.
The Foreign Commercial Service in the Department of Commerce
provides information and assistance to American businesses and
helps potential Chinese buyers learn about U.S. goods and services.
The Dalien Management Center, supported by the DOC, provides a
training program for Chinese managers. The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) has insured over 20 U.S. investments
in China.
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However, the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank's programs are
comparatively limited because it is guided by the principle that the
private sector should finance exports unless the national interest is
involved or a competing foreign investor is assisted by a national
government. Even before Tiananmen both the Ex-Im Bank and OPIC
programs were being scaled back due to budgetary constraints.
Moreover, there was no official U.S. aid program vis a vis China.
Since there was no formal aid program to China, and because of
opposition to use "mixed credits," low cost programs were a vital tool
for the U.S. Government to support the early stages of projects. One
such program was the Trade and Development Program. This
program provided project planning services, including feasibility
studies, and had yielded great returns. For instance, a $440,000 TDP
feasibility study of a hydropower project led to $20 million in U.S.
exports.
Because of the poor performance on behalf of the U.S. to officially
help in the financial arena, China was resentful. The other two major
sources of financial aid to China involve the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because of the significant role
the U.S. played in these institutions China viewed the actions of the
IMF and World Bank as a United States' action. In other words, these
institutions were directly linked to Sino-U.S. relations.
One aspect of China's concern was the inability of developing
countries to service debt and become developed without some form
of "new" economic order (China considers itself the largest
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developing country). Regarding a summit of the "Seven Industrial
Powers" Zhao Ziyang said he hoped the summit would "put emphasis
on the problem of the North-South economic disparity in the
world. "88
Because the IMF and World Bank are the primary institutions
that raise funds for financial assistance to the developing countries it
is up to these institutions to change the economic disparities between
the "haves" and "have nots." Wang Bingqian, then Chinese State
Councilor and Finance Minister, identified the major obstacles before
an IMF-World Bank meeting:
Intensified trade protectionism practised by a number of the
developed countries, their reduction of official development aid,
and rising real interest rates have made it hard for the
developing countries to overcome their economic difficulties. 89
The Chinese bitterly criticized the U.S. for its irrational monetary
and fiscal policy while enjoying the benefits of a helpful economic
relationship on the eve of Tiananmen. With the outbreak in June,
1989, in Beijing, U.S.-PRC economic relations took on an entirely
different tone.
88"Zhao Briefs Sakurauchi ON PRC's Economic Growth," FBIS. April 29, 1983, Dl.
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IV. CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN: WHAT NEXT?
Though the first chapter indicated the course China's
modernization was taking we must address the situation after the
bloody crackdown in Tiananmen square. Many have said that the
incident proves that China's leadership does not want to lose power,
or that the democracy movement was only temporarily crushed.
However, the direction that China has taken will be crucial for future
U.S. policy decisions. Thus, we must determine if a substantial
alteration in China's reforms have occurred since June, 1989.
Perhaps the most crucial aspect in determining which direction
China will go depends upon the person in power. As a result of
Tiananmen Zhao Ziyang was replaced by Li Peng, notably more
conservative with respect to reform. Thus, it becomes important to
keep track of the leadership within China in order to obtain some
grasp of the future course.
In China's Second Revolution, Harry Harding described what he
called the radical reformers and the moderate reformers.90 The
radical reformers included Hu Yaobang (served as General Secretary
of the CCP from 1982-1987), Zhao Ziyang (recently resigned as
General Secretary), Hu Qili, Tian Jiyuan, and Wang Zhaoquo (the last
three being younger leaders appointed to Party Secretariat in mid-
90 Harding, pp80-l.
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1980's). They supported more sweeping reforms at a faster pace,
and were reported to favor some political relaxations.
The moderate reformers included Chen Yun (Chinese Economist),
Li Peng (current Premier), Peng Zhen (Chairman, National Peoples
Congress Standing Committee), Hu Qiaomu (ideologist in the
Politburo), and Deng Liqun (member of Secretariat with overall
responsibility for propaganda). They support a smaller range of
reforms at a much slower pace. In fact, it would be more
appropriate to call them "modernizers" because they do wish to
improve China's backwardness, but are not willing to do this at the
expense of their hold on power. The role of Deng Xiaoping would be
to balance the two factions, protecting the radical reformers to some
degree, but as Tiananmen points out, will not forego the Party's
power.
Interestingly enough, Jiang Zemin, the new General Secretary, is
not listed in either of the above groups. This could lead one to
believe that he is perhaps a "puppet" of Deng, and that he wields
little, if any, power. On the other hand, Jiang may have power due to
the fact that he has Deng's trust. At any rate, it now becomes more
important to pay close attention to what is said in China, and by
whom. For example, two relatively younger Party members were
elevated to the level of Deputy Prime Ministers. Zhu Rongji, former
Mayor of Shanghai, and Zou Jiahua, the head of the State Planning
Commission, were given the new posts in April, 1991. Zhu was
denounced as a rightist in 1957, and is known to favor broader
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reforms. Less is known about Zou, but is also considered a plus for
the reform faction. It has even been rumored that the elevation may
indicate the eventual removal as Li Peng as Premier. Personnel
shifts, however, are not the only indications of continued reform.
A. HINTS OF REFORM
Shortly after the crackdown, Deng Xiaoping remarked:
Reform and opening up must not be changed. We should
stress that they will remain unchanged for several decades. If
we want to think of changing, it must be after the realization of
the four modernizations. 91
In October, 1989, Deng made further steps to reinforce China's
desire to reform by separating Zhao Ziyang's personal mistakes from
the "correct" ideas of reform. Deng went so far as to have the
question on Zhao's future shelved for two years. Deng remarked,
"Zhao Ziyang supports reform and the open door policy."92
Jiang Zemin, the new Party General Secretary, explained China's
position on the whole affair:
The essence of the matter, however, was that some individuals
plotted an overthrow of the Communist Party leadership and the
socialist system in China under the pretext of opposing
corruption and used the students to achieve this aim of theirs.93
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In the summer of 1990, Beijing appeared to be taking positive
steps. There was talk of converting state owned companies to joint
stock concerns. Li Yining, economics professor of Beijing University
and former advisor to Zhao Ziyang, was allowed to say that China
needed to "develop the securities market as a way of freeing itself
from the current financial predicament." Beijing reaffirmed the
continuance of the contract system. 94 Furthermore, Jiang Zemin
hinted at continued reforms by stating that "reform has not caught
up."
Other positive steps were seen in 1990. The 1979 Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law that was promised, but failed to
appear during a 1989 session of the NPC, was finalized for
promulgation at a 1990 session in order to reinvigorate the declining
interest of foreign investors. Efforts were also accelerated to
complete a copyright law. China began speeding up preparations for
labor laws. China requested occasional assistance from the World
Bank, the United Nations, and foreign experts to draft laws to
regulate companies, banks, railways, and unfair competition. 95
Furthermore, Jiang Zemin decided it was time to release Fang
Lizhi, the astro-physicist and democracy advocate who had been
staying in the American Embassy since June, 1989. Jiang had
decided that the situation would only continue to cause strain in the
94
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Sino-U.S. relationship, and it would be best to release him. Besides,
Fang was a "dead tiger" and it would be unlikely for him to create
trouble in the future.96
Another positive step was taken in October, 1990, when the
Chinese Academy of Sciences resumed ties with the American
National Academy of Sciences and the American National Scientific
Foundation after suspension in June, 1989. 97 This demonstrates a
desire to continue improvement in China's technology and hence,
modernization.
More recently, China enacted measures that would seem to
indicate a move toward fair competition among domestic industry.
Effective January 1, 1991, China scrapped its export subsidies. The
move was primarily designed to curb growth of the independence of
regional government's and to promote heavy industry ahead of light
industry. Furthermore, China would begin an overhaul of the
internal allocation of foreign exchange earnings. Again, this was to
reduce the deficit plus the introduction of a unified trade policy.98
At first glance these measure would seem to indicate a period of
retrenchment. However, curbing the independence of regional
governments restores much of the dissipated power of the central
authorities. It may be more directed at controlling the prevalent
96Cheng Ming in FBIS . July 3, 1990, ppl6-18.
91Xinhua in FBIS, October 11, 1990, p4.
98 Elizabeth Cheng, "Power to the centre," FEER . January 24, 1991, p34.
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corruption associated with regional independence. Reducing
subsidies will also require enterprises to become more innovative
and efficient, especially if bankruptcy laws are promulgated. The
scrapping of subsidies ended all policy privileges for state
enterprises in Guangdong, Fujien, and the SEZ's. They must now
compete on a more equal footing with northern industries. The
removal of export subsidies may also enhance China's entry into
GATT. Finally, the scrapping of subsidies will save the central
government a substantial amount. For example, direct and indirect
subsidies to state enterprises in 1990 were 106.4 billion renminbi.
The recent measures also effected the foreign trade agencies'
profit margins. China's foreign trade agencies can now retain 70% of
their earnings from electrical and capital goods, 50% from other
products (10% to local government, 40% to companies), and export-
processing enterprises can keep 90% of their earnings.
It seems that the current trend is very similar to that of the early
1980's. Much of the same rhetoric is being used, and the priorities of
granting greater autonomy to enterprises and the consideration of
price reform continue. Ma Hong, Director General of the State
Council's Economic, Technological, and Social Development Research
Center wants to push China's economic construction forward:
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However, the tasks for reform are from being completed: The
new economic structure has not been full-fledged; enterprises
(especially enterprises of ownership by the whole people) have
not fully accomplished financial independence; the price system
has not been ironed out; the socialist market system remains
incomplete and imperfect, and still in its development, while the
macrocontrol means are in the same condition; hence, further
exploration in the specific form of linking planning to the market
is involved."
To implement reform in the 1990's, China would not only issue its
Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), but would adopt a Ten-Year Plan
as well. The general goal would be to establish a "new socialist
planned commodity economic system," and an economic operation
mechanism which "integrates the planned economy with market
regulation." 100 With that goal in mind, the Chinese would implement
five main tasks:
1. Establish an ownership system with socialist public
ownership as the predominant force and diverse economic sectors
developing alongside.
2. Establish a system of enterprises that will suit the
development of a large-scale socialized production. Except for a
small number of noncompetitive enterprises, all enterprises should
become competitive enterprises with the capacity for self-
management, responsibility for profits and losses, self-
development, and self-restraint. They should become commodity
99Ta Kung Pao in FBIS . January 8, 1991, p47.
l00Renmin Ribao in FBIS . March 20, 1991, p50.
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producers and dealers, imbued with vigor and vitality and
operating according to standard procedures.
3. Establish a unified and open socialist market system with
complete rules and regulations for fair competition. The prices of a
few important commodities and services vital to the national
economy and the people's livelihood will continue to be set by the
state. Meanwhile, production and circulation of other commodities
will be open and subject to market regulation under the guidance
of planning.
4. Establish a two-tier macroeconomic regulation and control
system at the central, provincial, autonomous regional, and
municipal levels which combines direct and indirect regulation and
control, with indirect and the central authorities' regulation and
control as the main forms.
5. Establish a system for distributing individual incomes, with
distribution according to labor as the main body supplemented by
other distribution methods, and a social security system. 101
The new plans are strikingly similar to the reforms discussed in
Section II above. The main difference is that now the Chinese want a
slower pace. In discussing the new plans Li Peng remarked that
China wanted to maintain the rate of growth around six percent. 102
This is primarily to avoid the inflationary tendencies of past reforms.
101 Ibid., pp50-51.
l02Ching Chi Tao Pao in FBIS . March 21, 1991, p32.
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Another difference in the "new" reforms is the priority given to
large projects. Earlier, it had been noted that reform stressed small
to medium industry, though actual statistics may have proved
otherwise. This time, however, the Chinese are making large
enterprises a priority. For example, 550 billion yuan has been
earmarked for 10,000 projects for the Eighth Five-Year Plan, 62 of
which are for retooling industries. This is a 38.4% increase over the
amount provided to large industry in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. 103
Upgrading technology of current and new enterprises is even given
priority over projects improving China's infrastructure. Apparently,
China feels more than ever that the production of quality goods for
export is the goal.
In fact, China has gone so far as to set up "Technology Zones"
which are similar to the SEZ concept. 104 The government is allocating
1.7 billion yuan to facilitate the construction of fundamental facilities
of these new zones. Enterprises established in the zones will receive
the same preferential treatment as the SEZ's in that they are
exempted from taxation for the first three years, and their tax rate
will be 15% in the subsequent three years; if the export of an
enterprise's products can reach a certain level, its tax rate can be
further reduced (specific level not given).
103 Beijing Domestic Service in FBIS . April 12, 1991, pl9.
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As mentioned earlier, the other avenue the Chinese have pursued
to obtain technology is through foreign investment. To enhance
foreign investment the Chinese promulgated the PRC Income Tax
Law (Draft) on April 2, 1991. 105 This new law provides for single
proportional tax rates providing easier understanding of taxes; the
rates have been lowered to 33%, with a minimum rate of 15%; special
cuts for foreign-invested enterprises in State-Council-designated
areas up to 15% as long as they invest in energy, traffic, port, and
harbor development or the construction of other projects encouraged
by the state; and more strict enforcement of the law (i.e., violators
will be punished).
There have also been moves toward greater price reform. The
State Administration of Commodity Prices has decided that a major
goal of the Eighth Five-Year Plan is to reduce control over prices.
The main reason is to reduce the number of goods subsidized by the
state, which amounted to 22.45 billion yuan in 1990 alone. 106 This
has created a considerable drain on central funds. Furthermore,
price increases should not exceed six percent annually in order to
keep pace with the intended rate of growth and to avoid inflation.
The primary commodities to have increases are in petrol, coal, and
transportation in order to spur development in those areas. Food
105 Renmin Ribao in FBIS . April 15, 1991, p28.
l06South China Morning Post in FBIS . April 24, 1991, p30.
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prices will also be increased in order to pay for the cost of
production.
A final indication of continued reforms is China's vehement
opposition to the possible loss of MFN status with the U.S. This
should be seen as a crying out for continued technology and contacts
to push modernization forward. Of course, their definition of
modernization is different, and their goal is different. None the less,
it demonstrates the desire to open up to Western influences. All in
all, the Chinese leadership seems determined to carry on the
modernization of China.
B. HINTS OF RETRENCHMENT
Even though there are signs that China wishes to continue its
modernization program, including the open door policy, there are
also recent signals indicating economic as well as political
retrenchment. For example, the China Survey Service, using 30
'experts' to conduct an economic resources study which began three
years ago, issued an adverse report. It said that based on China's
huge aging population, poor resources and infrastructure, and
decreasing arable land, an "appropriate method of development"
should be adopted instead of current plans: "Based on the conditions
it analyzed, the report suggested an unconventional approach
towards modernization, in which the traditional high speed economic
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increase oriented strategy is replaced by the one emphasizing on
consistent, coordinated development (italics mine)." 107
Unfortunately, the leadership always stressed a steady growth
rate in the past; neither too fast or too slow. The remark "traditional
high speed growth" might indicate that the PRC is intent on limiting
foreign investments. This would be consistent with trying to
eliminate corrupting elements from foreign society. It may also be
an attempt to warn the domestic population that future growth may
be slow in light of the international sanctions being imposed.
The other two key words are "unconventional" and "coordinated."
It is most likely that unconventional refers to some new approach to
reform, though it is too early to tell what that may be. "Coordinated,"
on the other hand, most likely indicates increased centralization, at
least in the short term. Thus, it seems like "Tiananmen" has had an
immediate impact on China's economic modernization, but their
continued demands for loans, capital investment, and Most Favored
Nation status would imply that certain aspects of modernization
continues.
Other aspects that will be discouraging to the U.S. is how the
Chinese treated the Tiananmen massacre and other ideological
rhetoric since June, 1989. For example, a Xinhua release, referring to
the secret Scowcroft visits, completely downplayed the Tiananmen
incident. Mostly stating approval of the visits, the article made only
107
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one remark regarding the bilateral relationship: "The two sides also
discussed Sino-U.S. relations," and, "solving as soon as possible the
disputes on some problems between the two countries since last
June, so that Sino-U.S. relations can enjoy a new development. "[Ref.
92] 108 It would appear that human rights continue to be a low
priority in China. Another warning sign that was ignored in the past
was socialist rhetoric. Considering the unfolding of events, however,
it is wise to take notice of them. Thus, the statement, "As a
Communist, I am convinced that socialism will triumph in the
end," 109 from Jiang Zemin, the current Party General Secretary, may
be an important factor in determining how to proceed with China.
The most notable restriction to continued reforms will be the
pace of reform including the emphasis on stability. This is a direct
link to the events in Tiananmen in 1989. The main argument is that
an unstable China is adverse to the people's human rights (those of
having food and a decent standard of living) and the rest of Asia and
the world. The principle of stability is noticeable in most speeches
on reform. For example, Qian Qichen, China's Foreign Minister
remarked:
l0SXinhua in FBIS . December 11, 1989, ppl-5.
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We shall continue to carry on the reforms and the opening up-
policy. We so this only according to China's own conditions and
for the Chinese people's benefit, and we do not plan to copy any
foreign model. ..If some people try to impose their social system
and values on China, they will never be accepted by the Chinese
people. 1 10
Perhaps more disheartening for human rights advocates in the
U.S. was an article that referred to Deng's recent views on
China's situation:
To grasp this opportunity, China must stress stability. Only
when China has stability, reform, and opening up, can it go on
developing. ..To be stable, China must have a core, which is
adhering to the four cardinal principles. 111
The four principles of upholding the leadership of the Communist
Party (preserving the general structure of state, following a socialist
course in economic development, and maintaining Marxism as the
official ideology) can only imply that the current leadership wishes
to continue on its present path. In other words, modernization
remains socialist and future demonstrators can expect the worst.
Another unfortunate prospect is the possibility that state
planners are thinking about recollectivizing state agriculture to
increase grain production. 112 Despite the record harvest in 1990 of
ll0Renmin Ribao in FBIS . October 10, 1990, p5.
lll Wen Wei Po in FBIS . June 18, 1990, p30.
112South China Morning Post in FBIS . March 21, 1991, pp41-42.
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435 million tonnes of grain China still had to import 15 million
tonnes to feed its people. Estimates indicate 520 million tonnes will
be needed by the year 2000. Therefore, by limiting the scope of the
responsibility system and using collectives the state would have
more control over what is planted. Furthermore, the collectives
would facilitate the use of large agricultural machinery and
potentially increase output.
In summary, the Chinese wish to continue their modernization
effort as described in Section II. In fact, most of the literature
reveals much of the same type of discussions on reform, including
the socialist character. It also appears that China's reforms will
continue to be cyclical in nature, going into periods of retrenchment
as the economy heats up and inflation and deficits pressure the
"radical reformers" to succumb to hardliner pressure. The major
addition to the new reforms is the six percent growth rate, and the
continued references to maintaining stability (which was always
there but now more apparent). Most importantly, the key to China's
future lies within its leadership. As to which faction dominates after
the older leaders pass away no one can tell; but it is that very
question that is so crucial to future Sino-U.S. relations.
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V. U.S. POLICY AFTER TIANANMEN
The immediate reaction to China's violent crackdown of the
"democracy movement" was one of outrage, protest, and disbelief.
Most countries responded with harsh rhetoric immediately following
the massacre, but withheld imposing sanctions while waiting to see
how events would unfold. Though the violence lasted only two days
in the square itself, the PRC began a "vigilante" program, hunting
down suspected instigators of the movement, and purging its own
party of unwanted sympathizers.
U.S. policy after Tiananmen would consist of a number of
sanctions imposed on China. The dilemma, though, was to what
degree should they be carried to. President Bush, on the one hand,
decided it was best not to isolate China totally through economic
sanctions. On the other hand, Congress and many others, including
Chinese students and American specialists on China, felt it advisable
to impose heavy sanctions on China as punishment for their action.
As a result of the opposing positions, U.S. China policy would be hotly
debated in America.
A. THE PRAGMATISTS
The United States responded on June 5, 1989, by suspending all
government to government and commercial sales of weapons to
China, suspending visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders,
giving a sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students to
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extend their stay in the U.S., offering aid via the Red Cross for the
wounded, and reviewing the U.S. -China bilateral relationship. 113
President Bush did not, however, pose any economic sanctions at that
time because he wanted to leave the option open while waiting to see
if China's repressive policies would cease. 114 This did not happen.
With military sanctions imposed, President Bush tried to use
economic sanctions to further influence China's leadership. With
those, "in the bag," he attempted to get the Chinese Government to
grant clemency for captured protesters sentenced to death and stop
the search for those not caught. The attempt failed. China continued
its repressive policies. In a hope to curtail China's policies the White
House imposed further sanctions on China. These included the
suspension of "high level" meetings between U.S. and Chinese
officials, the indefinite suspension of $1.3 billion in international
bank loans, opposition to liberalize COCOM restrictions regarding
China, suspension of export licenses for U.S. satellites to be launched
by China, and stalling implementation of the Sino-U.S. agreement
regarding nuclear energy. 115
The early U.S. response to Tiananmen was hopefully designed to
prevent further repressive actions on the part of the PRC. The
administration genuinely tried to help the Chinese people. But as
1 13 William McGurn, "Tiananmen Square," in The Broken Mirror . pp235-6.
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time dragged on, and it became apparent that military sanctions,
suspension of high level talks, and attempts to stop loans from going
to China were not producing results, the administration had to
develop a new strategy. In doing so, the administration would end
up trying to establish a "base" from which to work. U.S. -Chinese
relations were important. In the attempt to sustain the relationship,
though, President Bush would end up carrying out actions appearing
to oppose stated policy and, therefore, create an aura of
inconsistency, confusion, and illusion. Critics in the Congress, and the
general public would come to wonder what exactly U.S. China policy
entailed.
The administration, particularly President Bush, never intended
for Sino-U.S. relations to break apart. Though Bush demonstrated
contempt for China's actions by claiming "we can't have totally
normal relations unless there's a recognition of the validity of the
student's aspirations." 116 United States policy towards China
remained relatively normal. In fact, two days prior to that statement
the United States was "engaged in diplomatic efforts" to correct the
situation. 1 17
One fear was that economic sanctions may do more harm than
good. Such sanctions might actually hurt the people of China, those
116Nicholas D. Kristof, "Relations With U.S. Seem Badly Hurt By Crushing of
Democracy Protests," NYT, June 11, 1989: A16; 1.
11
'From transcripts of Bush News conference, Washington D.C., June 8, 1989,
reprinted in NYT . June 9, 1989: A22; 1.
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we wanted to help, more than its leaders. Another fear was that an
enormous amount of sanctions might give Chinese hardliners
ammunition to overtake the government. If this happened, Deng's
reform movement would likely be halted. The United States would
then have jeopardized an important relationship. As Michel
Oksenburg, a China-watcher, put it, "at this moment of
understandable emotional fury we have to remember the bigger
picture." 118
Furthermore, the administration did not want American private
business to pay the price for sanctions. The "future involvement of
American business in China could be influenced greatly by further
economic sanctions imposed." 119 In other words, big business would
lose money. Moreover, Americans would not only lose profits, but
they would be lost to Japanese companies because the Japanese were
not going to wait for China's human rights policy to improve in order
to continue doing business. For example, the U.S. granted a waiver to
Boeing Industries allowing an airplane contract to go through to
China. According to administration officials, "the decision to grant
the waiver was made by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3rd and
was coordinated with the White House." When the officials were
118 Michel Oksenburg, "Confession of a China Watcher," Newsweek. June 19, 1989,
p30.
119 Richard W. Stevenson, "Companies Hesitating on China," NYT . July 3, 1989: A25;
6.
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asked if President Bush knew about it, they replied: "I'm sure he's
aware of it." 120
The administration would also seek to "soften or eliminate the
sanctions against China voted by Congress," that occurred in late
1989 (see Moralist section below). It was time that "human rights
stop driving our foreign policy." 121 Instead, U.S. national interests
should dictate policy. The administrations decision to continue talks
with Beijing about closer trade relations reflects the conviction that
such talks serve both countries long-term interests. 122 Here we
begin to see the overriding concern. Though human rights are an
important part of U.S. foreign policy, they are not the only concern.
Other interests, such as trade, must be considered.
Though Congress would be quick to criticize Bush's China policy,
the President had many outside supporters. A lobby of well known
businessmen prompted by Richard Nixon urged a return to business-
as-usual. 123 Henry Kissinger, in his syndicated column, argued that
"China remains too important for America's national security to risk
1
^Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Grants Boeing Waiver To Deliver Jetliners to China," NYT.
July 8, 1989: Al; 6.
121 R. W. Apple Jr., "Reaction to China Reopens Old Battle," NYT. September 11, 1989:
A16; 1.
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the relationship of the emotions of the moment." 124 The importance
of maintaining relations must outweigh the sentimental pleas for
human rights. Even the Chinese wanted the relationship to continue.
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, when meeting with Secretary Baker,
said: "the fundamentals of the relationship haven't altered." 125
President Bush did not have to look far for help. In October,
1989, former President Nixon visited the PRC on a "fact-finding"
mission. Openly criticizing the events in Tiananmen, Nixon still
looked favorably upon U.S.-Sino relations. He would stress the
importance of a continued relationship. It was time to move ahead.
Both countries were hoping his trip would "smooth relations." 126
Perhaps the most spectacular indication of U.S. foreign policy was
the high level "secret" visit of the President's National Security
advisor, Brent Scrowcroft, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, to China in December, 1989. In a
seemingly direct violation of stated policy not to have meetings
between high level officials, the President secretly sent two of his
closest advisors to China. This was not all. During the December visit
it surfaced that both officials had visited Beijing in July, less than one
month after the terrible massacre of Chinese demonstrators (it would
124 Henry Kissinger, "The Caricature of Deng as Tyrant Is Unfair," Washington Post .
August 1, 1989: A21.
125Nicholas D. Kristof, "U.S.-China Falling-Out: Much Smoke But No Fire," NYT,
September 30, 1989: A5; 1.
126 See NYT . October 29, 1989: All; 1.
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be found out later that this occurred on or around July 4,
Independence Day).
According to some administration officials the purpose of the
December visit was to send "a political signal that we are now ready
to resume relations on a more normal basis." 127 However, Bush
contradicted this by stating: "To those suggesting that I have
normalized the relationship with this power because of one visit,
they simply are wrong." 128 Bush further confused the situation by
suggesting that it wasn't the time to remove sanctions. Why had he
been granting waivers if sanctions should not be removed?
Obviously, the President was trying to play down the visits. Shortly
after the Scowcroft-Eagleburger embarrassment, and the statement
that sanctions were not removed, Bush continued "normalizing"
relations by waiving a "Congressional ban. ..on loans to companies that
do business with China." He also approved the "export of three
communication satellites" to China. This, of course, was not
favoritism towards China, but was "in the national interest of the
United States to approve export licenses." 129
The next step towards "normalization" came in the form of China's
removal of martial law from Beijing on January 10, 1990. Not
127
"China Trip Seeks to Alter Americans' Perceptions," NYT. December 10, 1989:
A23; 1.
128 Maureen Dowd, "Bush Defends China Visit," NYT. December 17,1989: A32;l
129 Andrew Rosenthal, "President Waives Some China Curbs," NYT . December 20,
1989: Al;4.
80
missing a beat, the U.S. immediately announced that it was easing
blanket opposition to World Bank loans to China. 130 President Bush
announced that $780 million in World Bank loans that had been
withheld would be reexamined on a case by case basis. It was
emphasized that only "basic human needs" loans would be approved,
as opposed to "project" loans. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Export-
Import Bank approved a $9.75 million loan for the China National
Offshore Oil Company to purchase oil equipment and machinery. 131
Three days later the Ex-Im Bank approved another $23.1 million for
the Shanghai Transport system, and the World Bank provided $30
million for earthquake relief. 132 Apparently, basic "human needs"
loans were broadly defined.
China's lifting of martial law in January, 1990, had a salutary
effect on American policy. Only a month later, though, the
administration continued to confuse people by voiding a sale of plane
parts to Beijing. On February 2, 1990, Bush nullified the sale of
airplane parts by Mamco Manufacturing Company to a military
related agency (China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation) of the PRC. An eight agency task force said the parts
130Robert Pear, "U.S. Easing Curbs As China Declares Martial Law Over," NYT.
January 11, 1990: Al;6.
131 Clyde H. Farnsworlh, "Ex-Im Bank Resumes Aid to China," NYT. February 6, 1990,
Dl:3.
132Clyde H. Farnsworth, "China Wins Two Loans Backed by U.S.," NYT . February 9,
1990, A3:4.
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involved sensitive materials and should not be sold to the PRC on
National Security grounds. 133
Though it appeared to contradict Mr. Bush's policy towards China,
it was not clear whether either the World Bank loans or the plane
parts sale signaled a change in that policy. 134 Finally, to put a cap on
the entire response to the Tiananmen massacre the State
Department, in February, issued the harshest criticism yet towards
China, stating that China had "pervasive, severe violations of human
rights in Beijing, Tibet, and other parts of China last year." 135
The current debate in Sino-U.S. relations has turned once again to
the issue of MFN. Before the June 3, 1991, the deadline for Bush to
certify to Congress that China's emigration policy was satisfactory,
the President announced his decision to grant the extension to China.
Shortly afterwards, the President announced that the U.S. was
imposing three new sanctions on China, including the blocking of
computer technology that applies to missile tests. Though the
administration denies it, many consider this a ploy to make Congress
more amenable to granting China MFN status.
Basically, however, the same arguments discussed in Section III
on trade restrictions still apply. The Chinese people, including Hong
133 Susumu Awanohara, "China card shuffled," FEER, February 15, 1990, pi 3.
134 Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation Concern to
China," NYT . February 3, 1990: Al;5.
135 Robert Pear, "U.S. Report Accuses China of Grave Rights Abuses," NYT . February
4, 1990: A26;3
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Kong, along with the American consumer are apt to be the most
affected by denying MFN status to China. It also seems unlikely that
Congress will develop enough votes to override a Presidential veto if
they pass a bill that links MFN to human rights in addition to
emigration policy. Thus, as in 1990, China will retain MFN, Congress
will complain for a brief time, and it will fade away as the fiscal year
nears its end and budget considerations dominate U.S. politics.
The entire course of events from June 4, 1989, to the present
have been designed to maintain normal relations with the PRC.
President Bush had difficulty dealing with the tremendous
outpouring of protest, both in Congress and publicly, towards the
events the Chinese Government chose to pursue in Tiananmen.
While trying to satisfy public outcry to punish China he also chose to
satisfy the Chinese Governments' desire to maintain good relations
with the United States. While stating that relations would not, could
not, be normal between the United States and China, his actions as an
administrator kept relations as normal as they could be. But why
create contradictory policies that could potentially jeopardize
America's reputation in order to maintain ties with an openly
repressive government in China? The answer depends on how one
views U.S. -China relations.
Susan L. Shirk, in a Foreign Policy article, wrote that how we
estimate the degree to which U.S. interests are at stake in the
relationship and how we evaluate the fragility of the relationship
will determine whether or not the administration is right to treat
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China as an exception to America's human rights policy. 136 She was
talking about the Carter administration then, but the same view
could be applied to Bush's policy on China. The point is that if the
relationship is weak, we should be careful with policy that may
jeopardize that relationship, as long as the relationship fulfills U.S.
interests. Apparently, even after the June massacre the Bush
administration felt that continued U.S. relations with China was in the
national interest. Harsh economic and political sanctions against
Beijing would perhaps have put that relationship back twenty years,
to the pre-1972 position.
The United States needs China as a possible counterweight to
Soviet aspirations in Asia, and needs China also to remain relevant in
Japanese eyes as a key shaper of Asian events. 137 This statement by
Henry Kissinger in August of 1989 was made prior to the reduced
East-West tensions that resulted from Gorbachev's acceptance of
events in Eastern Europe in November. However, it underlies one
former theme guiding U.S. policy in Asia: that of countering the
Soviet threat. Hence, one possibility for Bush's insistence on
maintaining relations is geopolitical. From June until the fall of the
Berlin Wall one main concern that U.S. sanctions might do was to
drive the Chinese into Soviet arms. This would possibly have put the
136Susan L. Shirk, "Human Rights: What About China," Foreign Policy. No. 29 (Winter
77-78): 109-127.
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strategic balance on the side of the communists, and weaken the
relative strength of NATO. This concern now has disappeared.
During the protests in May 1989, while Mikhail Gorbachev was
in Beijing, there was even the fear that "for free nations, the Sino-
Soviet rapprochement is not a net plus." 138 U.S. policy towards China
during and after the protests may have been designed not to
antagonize the Chinese. Yet Bush stated he was not worried about
the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Does this mean President
Bush was not concerned about the strategic balance? After
November of 1989 U.S. -Soviet tensions were reduced. However, the
Soviets had created a new political influence in Asia not seen before.
Was this new Soviet political influence possibly a greater threat than
the military threat? Or does the U.S. have other interests in China?
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State, would argue in
February before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that China's
strategic value had not been diminished by the reduction in U.S.-
Soviet tensions, but the emphasis of China's strategic importance had
shifted to other problem areas such as global pollution, weapons
proliferation, Cambodia.
China is a country of great importance for it influences stability in
Asia. Outside pressures will almost certainly strengthen conservative
138 William Safire, "The Long Demarche," NYT. May 18, 1989: A31;5.
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hardliners and weaken moderate reformers. 139 The concern may
have been that continuing sanctions after Beijing lifted martial law
would favor hardliners. The reforms achieved over the past ten
years would then be considered useless. The result may be tension
in U.S.-China relations. The U.S. could lose potential influence over an
important Asian nation. It also seemed that not all hope for reforms
was destroyed at Tiananmen. For example, China had readmitted a
correspondent for Voice of America into the country, the possibility
of a Peace Corps program was being talked about, and they had
supported the United State's in the Gulf conflict. As Lawrence
Eagleburger put it: "The forces favoring reform have not
disappeared." 140
The business world also looked to China to satisfy American
interests in trade. The United States could lose a large potential
market. There are big opportunities in China, and America can not
afford to lose the market to the Japanese, the Germans, or anyone
else. 141 The United States also has other interests in China.
Politically, it was a big country in a vital area. One of growing
importance. And China has influence over its neighbors. China is
139Doak Bamett, "Increasingly, Bush Seems Right on China," NYT . January 21, 1990:
D21;l.
140Robert Pear, "U.S. Official Urges 'Real World' View of China," NYT . February 8,
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also a military power and, therefore, must be reckoned with. Finally,
the economic interests in China are great. U.S. policy cannot cause
the doors to be closed. Sanctions could also result in China's
withdrawal inward.
The most comprehensive and thought-out reasons for the
administrations policy were presented by Eagleburger before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As he put it:
This is a long-haul situation. It will take a good bit of time.
We are hopeful, but can certainly not guarantee that the process
we are now following will, in fact, lead the Chinese Government
toward reform and democratization, economic and political. 142
Furthermore:
The issue is how best to transform rhetoric into reality. Do we
see[k] to isolate China and cause it to turn inward or do we seek
to facilitate its return to reform and openness by continuing to
pursue the contacts and ties that encouraged such reform in the
first place. 143
Finally, one interesting point Eagleburger brought out, was that
reform in China must occur from the top down, whereas in Eastern
Europe, the reform movement had a widespread grassroots base at
the bottom. Surprisingly, Senator Biden responded, "Quite frankly,
that is the only remotely sound explanation for your policy." 144
142Robert Pear, "U.S. Official Urges "Real World' View of China," New York Times,
February 8, 1990, pA17.
143 Eagleburger's testimony before Congress, Senate, U.S. Policy Towards China . p7.
144 Ibid., p47-8.
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Eagleburger would also argue that China's releasing of detainees
and ending martial law, and the other steps that they had taken,
were at least an earnest, to some degree, desire on the part of Beijing
to "begin to change the relationship and to begin to undo the steps
that they took at the time of Tiananmen Square." 145 Furthermore,
Eagleburger states that during the first (July) visit the Chinese were
cold; they did not really react to the talks, but just listened.
However, during the second visit (December), Eagleburger sensed a
slight breakthrough. As he put it, "there was a much better give and
take back and forth" the second time.
However, for the short term, China's human rights violations
overshadowed other U.S. interests in China. As a result, Congress
would be more reluctant to allow presidential waivers to go through.
The "post-Tiananmen" Chinese leadership would vehemently oppose
the economic sanctions and the threat of losing MFN from Congress.
They would argue that China's loss of MFN would harm U.S.
consumers and businesses. Inexpensive Chinese goods would no
longer be available, the Chinese market would be closed to the U.S.,
and investment opportunities would be lost.
While taking the pragmatic approach, Bush must also keep in
mind the opposition. Totally to ignore the "moralist" attitude toward
China could politically backfire. In a way, Bush has already done
this. He imposed sanctions immediately after the incident. Though
145 Ibid., p27
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he vetoed a Congressional bill to allow Chinese students to remain in
the U.S. the President achieved the same goal through administrative
means. The state department has issued incriminating documents on
China's human rights abuses. Technically, sanctions remain in affect,
and three new have been imposed recently. Thus, President Bush's
policy has tried to balance both the aspect of maintaining U.S. values
while trying to pursue U.S. interests.
B. THE MORALISTS
As mentioned above, President Bush's apparent "complacency"
towards the repressive Chinese Government was bitterly opposed by
some members of Congress. They attempted to make economic
sanctions into law passing a resolution 81-10 in the Senate, and 418-
in the House. 146 The opposition to Bush's China policy would
continue. Congress was outraged by the PRC's actions in June. They
were even more concerned with the course President Bush was
taking. The tensions would become worse as time went by.
Events took a turn for the worse when Congress passed a bill
extending visas for 40,000 Chinese students in America. This
became more of a battle between the administration and Congress,
over means to an end, but one that ultimately effected the Chinese
Government. The President, stated that he had sufficient power to
achieve the same objective administratively as the Bill did legally.
146 See NYT . July 15, 1989: A2; 4.
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Beijing urged the President to veto the Bill or else they would stop all
student-exchange programs. 147 The Bill was vetoed. In January of
1990 the House overrode the veto, 390-25. However, the Senate
failed by four votes to get the two-thirds majority needed to
override the veto. 148 Bush had won a major battle. He maintained
his political power. More importantly, he kept the making of foreign
policy in the executive branch of government (many felt this was a
defeat for human rights). Yet if the President achieves the same
objective as Congress where's the loss? Both sides gained: The
President was reaffirmed in his direction of foreign policy and
Congress had its voice heard in complaints over China's action.
The secret visits by General Scowcroft and Secretary Eagleburger
were particularly troublesome to some Congressmen. Apparently,
the U.S. could send top advisors to China without having normal
relations, and Presidential waivers did not "lift" sanctions. In his
attempt to show firmness towards the Chinese Mr. Bush confused
everyone. The trip was considered a double standard policy favoring
the Chinese at the students' expense. Would we have done the same
if it were the Soviets? Was President Bush "kowtowing to the
Chinese Government?" 149
147 Robert Pear, "Bush Rejects Bill on China Students," NYT. December 1, 1989: A24;
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Not only has there been a large controversy over China's MFN
status and GATT membership, but the "trade wars" continue. In late
December, 1990, the U.S. slashed China's quota's in key garment and
textile categories by half-million dozens. 150 The U.S. accused China of
evading quotas by using fraudulent country-of-origin certification.
There could also be a further one million dozen cut do to ongoing
investigations. Finally, the U.S. claims a $12 billion deficit with China,
second largest after Japan.
The issue of slave labor has also been raised in the MFN debate.
Congressional critics of Bush's policy indicate that those Tiananmen
demonstrators captured and punished are now being used to make
cheap products for export to the U.S. Chinese leaders have
repeatedly denied the accusations, stating that PRC law prohibits the
export of goods made from convict labor. Technically, if one pushes
the point, it could be argued that all labor in repressive, socialist
regimes, is slave labor. Therefore, no goods should be imported from
socialist countries. Some question the wisdom of basing U.S. foreign
policy decisions on such a matter as this.
Thus, there are many critics of Bush's policy concerned with the
current course of U.S. China policy. Foremost is the "double standard"
of human rights. As mentioned earlier, would the United States have
reacted in similar fashion had the Soviet Union killed thousands of its
people in Red Square? Is Tibet different from Kuwait? The U.S. has
150Carl Goldstein, "China needles U.S.," FEER, January 24, 1991, p35.
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funded rebels in Nicaragua to overthrow a totalitarian government.
In November, 1989, U.S. troops entered Panama searching for
Noriega, captured him, and put into power a leader who stood for
"democracy". Is it because China is so far away that we did not react
more harshly? The United States helped to oust Marcos from the
Republic of the Philippines for imposing martial law and severely
repressing the Filipino people. It seems, then, that Washington
applied "a different set of standards and expectations to China than
to most other nations." 151
Duality of standards will tend to weaken U.S. credibility in the
near future. Nations will have a difficult time believing what the U.S.
says. Instead, other states will have to ignore U.S. statements and
wait for actions. This could be dangerous. The U.S. may find that
threats no longer produce results. Instead, the U.S. might actually be
forced to carry out actions when that may not be desired. The
concept of deterrence is based on the principle of credibility. United
States' China policy may have reduced U.S. credibility. Current
policy may also give other nations, especially North Korea, Vietnam,
South Africa, and other totalitarian and repressive governments,
more leverage when dealing with the United States concerning
human rights issues. They will be able to attack our stand on "high
morals." They would be able to point and say, "you do not stand for
15 lMarie Gottschalk, "The Failure of American Foreign Policy," World Policy
Journal . Vol. 4, No. 4(Fall 1989): 667-684.
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human rights except in isolated cases." Instead, current policy
indicates that what Americans are really concerned about is
geopolitical stability and trade. This is not good for the credibility
the United States desires.
Domestically, President Bush's credibility was reduced due to the
secret meetings between Scowcroft-Eagleburger and Beijing. The
administration lied. While high level meetings were legally
suspended, some high level meetings were actually occurring. The
Iran-Contra affair took place not more than five years ago, when
George Bush was Vice President of the United States. Does this mean
that a President can lie to America and the world to achieve what he
claims is in the American national interest? Lying compounds the
already stated problems. Lying to the people and Congress hurts
future policy. The president may have lost much of the trust and
respect of the American people. Without those qualities it will be
harder for the administration to create public support for other
policy issues.
Granted, the American public forgets fairly quickly, but Congress
does not. They tend to harbor grudges. The Scowcroft trips will not
be forgotten. President Bush will have a much harder time lobbying
support in Congress for controversial foreign policy decisions, such as
Most Favored Nation status for China, or the Soviet Union. The
meeting between China's Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, and President
Bush, at the White House in November, 1990, was criticized. Had the
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U.S. made a deal with China on the U.N. resolution permitting the use
of all means to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait?
In order to quell the Congressional uproar China released over
900 political prisoners in 1990, lifted martial law in Tibet, released
Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi and his family, and voted favorably(or
abstained) on the U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. Though these were considered steps in the right direction
Congress was still intent on voting against MFN. However,
Congressional leadership failed to meet an October 18, 1990, deadline
to cast a vote on the issue. As a result, China maintained its MFN
status until June, 1991, at which time President Bush certified its
extension. 152
Surprisingly enough, while President Bush was supporting MFN
for China he was denying MFN for the Soviet Union because of the
recent turmoil in the Baltic Republics. 153 This did not set well with
Congress:
The President's position is completely inconsistent. That's what
happens when you have a policy based on expediency rather
than principle. 154
152 See Awanohara, "Rights or duties?" and Awanohara, "No more favours."
153R. W. Apple, "Bush Withholding Normal Trade Ties From The Soviets," New York
Times(NYT) . May 25, 1990, Al:6.
154 Ibid.
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The President defended his position by stating that the sanctions
on China "remain basically unchanged," and that "trade would drop,
drastically hurting exporters, consumers and investors." 155 One critic
argues for a harsher economic policy. Since trade with the West is
critical to China's modernization of both its economy and armed
forces, continued dealings with China will only strengthen the hands
of the authorities. 156 Moreover, the U.S. should ensure that China's
entry into GATT is consistent with the rules, linking membership to
such "market-opening measures as free pricing, copyright
guarantees, and so forth." 157
Two questions come to mind; if Congress was so opposed to
granting China MFN why did they miss the deadline? and how big a
loss is it if the U.S. were to lose less than one percent of its total
world trade and about 1.5% of its world investments?
In summary, it is possible that President Bush has done a
credible job of maintaining a delicate relationship, vital to world
stability, despite an inhuman event. Other nations appreciate the
fragility of any foreign relationship with China and understand that
China is a country adverse to foreign interference. Most nations
share the President's opinion that to create a more stable world,
155





especially in Asia, requires the participation and cooperation of
China. Therefore, Bush's approach to China may have been well
thought out in responding pragmatically instead of emotionally. His
policy may have contributed to an increase in credibility and to the
promotion of peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region.
On the domestic scene Bush's policy though criticized openly by
some may be applauded inwardly by others. Americans may
conclude that Bush really could not do otherwise than he did without
jeopardizing a permanent relationship. More importantly, Congress
may acquiesce in his point of view although as a democratic body it




Sino-U.S. bilateral economic relations have grown substantially
since the normalization of relations in 1979. One of the most
important factors in this growth has been China's modernization.
Even though the relationship has developed positively over the past
twelve years there have been conflicts.
Since the Chinese began agricultural reforms in 1978, substantial
progress has been made. The adoption of the household
responsibility system, greater autonomy for the peasants in decision
making, and price flexibility, created new incentives for increased
productivity. Unfortunately, inflation and poor infrastructure caused
a slowdown in this productivity to the point that without further
relaxation of prices and central planning the high growth rates of the
early to mid-1980's would have been impossible.
Industrial reform measures produced significant results for the
average worker. Greater autonomy for enterprises, price reform, and
the opening of coastal cities for international trade and commerce
improved China's standard of living. Yet the same obstacles that
faced the agricultural sector impacted the industrial sector.
After Tiananmen, the forces for reform continued to exist. The
Chinese leadership realizes that to continue modernization the help
of the outside world, particularly the Western countries, is needed.
In this sense, modernization will continue. However, it is in dealing
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with the West, especially the U.S., that problems arise because of the
tremendous difference in socio-economic systems.
This became apparent by the outrage expressed by the United
States towards Beijing's crackdown of democracy demonstrators in
Tiananmen square in June, 1989. However, the degree of outrage
may have been due in part by U.S. policy-maker's own
misperceptions of what China was really attempting to accomplish
through modernization. The U.S. also failed to appreciate the
extremes to which the Chinese Government would go to suppress
challenges to its own authority.
In Section II it was argued that China's reform policies were not
intended to transform China into a democracy or free market
economy. On the contrary, it was shown that China's reform had
always been geared to reform socialism. Market regulation, price
reforms, opening up, and agricultural reform were all used in the
attempt to produce a modern socialist country. It seems so simple,
but "modernization" means just that; to provide China with modern
equipment, management techniques, and technology, so they can
improve the welfare of the people in a socialist way.
Perhaps when China indicated that reforms would also include
the political system, Western democracies, especially the United
States, got their hopes up. However, Chinese political reform was
merely intended to increase the efficiency of the bureaucratic
structure left over from the previous 4000 years without
relinquishing any substantial control. It seems that the political
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direction in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe helped to fuel that
hope. Tiananmen provided a temporary setback.
U.S. economic policies towards China have been mixed, as far as
trying to help their modernization program. Trade has flourished to
some extent, but has been marred by disputes over trade balances.
That is, both nations feel that the relationship should be mutually
beneficial and equal, but conflicts have arisen because of American
restrictions on China's export trade. Until there is agreement on
what exports should be applied to China's quotas, the problem most
likely will remain.
In the areas of technology transfer and foreign investment both
sides have made progress. However, until China can obtain the levels
of technology desired from the U.S. it will continue to complain
and/or seek similar technologies from other sources. The complaints
from U.S. businesses(along with other foreigners) about China's
policies concerning investment will most likely continue, too. It
seems the greatest impact on China will be through continued
dialogue on what the rest of the world considers normal business
practices. U.S. investors should keep in mind that if the Chinese
perceive their trade deficit to be too large they will take measures to
discourage foreign investment until the deficit nears a balance.
Furthermore, as long as the U.S. review process on dual-use
technologies remains slow and complex, complaints from both the
Chinese and U.S. businesses will continue.
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Financial (or banking) issues are also related to this theme of
equality and mutuality of benefit. It is the disparity between the
developed and underdeveloped countries that frustrates China. The
main issue involves protectionist measures on the part of the
developed countries that hinder the others' development. Also
linked to trade and technology, the lack of any official U.S. aid
program for China, plus the United States' dominant role in the IMF
and World Bank, does not help the situation.
Closely associated with equality and mutual benefit is China's
concern over sovereignty and internal affairs. The disputes over
MFN, economic sanctions in response to the Tiananmen incident, and
regulations governing foreign direct investments and joint ventures
are directly related to China's perception of sovereignty. The Qing
Dynasty's inability to control foreign encroachment during the 19th
Century has left an enduring impact on the Chinese. It is hard for
Americans to relate to this phenomenon, but the Chinese have a
greater respect for history, perhaps, than Americans. It should be
remembered that the early rebellions in China during the latterl9th
and early 20th Centuries were rebellions directed towards foreign
encroachment. Therefore, when the U.S. criticizes Beijing's actions
towards its own people, and bases the granting of MFN or loans on
such affairs, China will react harshly; in their eyes it is another way
of foreigners attempting to control what goes on inside China. It is
not difficult to appreciate China's point of view.
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Thus, it appears that socialist modernization, equality and mutual
benefit, and sovereignty, are concrete concepts that must be
considered in policy formation. One does not have to agree with the
viability of socialist modernization, nor believe that we should treat
all nations equally, or that we should not meddle in China's internal
affairs. But by realizing that these concepts will exist into the
foreseeable future, one can better prepare for and predict the
outcome of U.S. policies towards China.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
The key to future U.S. policy considerations is to recognize that
China's modernization remains, for the foreseeable future, with its
socialist parameters. Realizing this, the U.S. can then determine if
good relations with China are essential for its own national security
purposes. Though the Soviet threat has diminished (and this is still
arguable), China remains vitally important respecting global security
issues that range from environmental damage to weapons
proliferation. Furthermore, as long as the Chinese remain a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council it seems
essential to maintain harmonious cooperation with China. The recent
Gulf War could be an indication of things to come, and having China
on the side of the U.S. will only help.
Currently, the most debatable aspect of Sino-U.S. relations is the
granting of MFN. The President has announced that he will extend
the waiver for another year (June 1991-June 1992). This is
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beneficial to both countries. First, it will not exacerbate an already
strained economic policy regarding China. The Chinese officials
would only consider the loss of MFN as an attack on them, and a
violation of their sovereignty. The problem lies within the United
States itself. Granting China MFN in view of their record in human
rights is anathema to many in Congress. To them, the United States
appears to have a double standard. One way out is to pass legislation
that removes the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
For those that argue the current policy only strengthens the hand
of the hardliners there is also the fact that contacts initiate change.
Though it cannot be proven, it would be safe to say that the
knowledge of what is possible has a very strong influence on those
Chinese who demonstrated at Tiananmen. The democracy movement
in 1989 was, in part, a cry for an increased standard of living. Few
such movements existed while China was economically isolated from
the West.
Besides the MFN issue, U.S. trade policies should be altered. The
continued pressure for protectionist measures is a hindrance to good
relations. The U.S. practice of including re-exports from Hong Kong in
China's quotas has created problems in the deficit question.
However, the U.S. could keep two accounts, one including China, and
one without. The purpose would be to begin an integration of Hong
Kong into China's economy. Finally, the U.S. must move away from
increased protectionist policies,.
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Technology transfers to China are hindered by both sides.
Without improvements in China's investment climate it is doubtful
that American businesses would be flocking to China's shores to
invest. On the other hand, the complex and often slow procedure for
reviewing critical technologies should be reformed. One
improvement would be to establish a concrete cutoff between the
yellow and red zones. Another improvement would be to establish a
precedent system in that when one technology is permitted to go
through, similar technologies could use past cases for review. One
approach would also be to allow technologies to be transferred
within a specified time limit.
In financial areas, the U.S. should create an official aid program
vis a vis China. This would not only provide aid to needed projects,
but create another level of contacts that could influence China policy.
It seems strange that for years the U.S. has not had an official aid
program for one of its most important relationships. Furthermore, if
the President has waivered MFN, it seems useless to waive World
Bank and IMF loans to China on a case-by case basis. The U.S. should
state its reasons and just remove the remaining sanctions. The
political backlash would be no worse than what has already occurred.
What must be borne in mind is that the current leadership in
China intends to maintain socialism as the dominant ideology, and
there is no guarantee that after Deng Xiaoping has passed away, the
resultant leadership will be any different. Even Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang maintained that China would be "socialist" in character,
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and there is no predicting the way in which "socialist" will be
defined. Thus, U.S. policy must be formulated with this in mind; U.S
policy must be flexible.
One must also decide the extent to which good relations with
China are useful for U.S. national security. Even those critical of U.S.
policy to date do not deny the need to maintain some sort of
relations with China. The question is how to have the greatest
influence on China, while realizing that any influence the U.S. have
will only be slight. As Richard Nixon once said:
The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not
remain isolated from the international community. ..The
principles underlying our relations with Communist China are
similar to those governing our policies toward the U.S.S.R.
United States policy is not likely soon to have much impact on
China's behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is
certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and
stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can
toward improved practical relations with Peking. 158
The U.S. must, again, decide what is most practical for U.S.
interests. The best way to improve economic relations is to keep the
human rights linkage in perspective and help China modernize in its
own preferred way. Only in this manner can the United States
protect and promote its vital interest in China and in the entire East
Asia and Pacific region.
l 58 Nixon's first Foreign Policy Report to Congress, February 1970, see Richard M.
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